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NOTES
Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and Minimum Legal Fee
Schedules: Learned Professions and State-Action Immunity
The question of whether the minimum fee schedules promulgated
by state and local bar associations violate the Sherman Act1 has caused
considerable debate both inside and outside the legal profession.2
Commentators have not only questioned the legality of these pricing
arrangements, but also the motives behind minimum fee schedules and
the results they produce.' In 1973 a federal court considered for the first
time the antitrust questions raised by the legal profession's use of min-
imum fee schedules. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar" a United
States district court ruled that minimum fee schedules constitute price-
fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.6 In
reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit vitalized the "learned profes-
sion" exemption from the antitrust laws, extended the "state action"immunity from antitrust liability,7 and found that the practice of law,
at least the practice of examining titles in Fairfax County, Virginia,
does not sufficiently "affect" interstate commerce to meet the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the Sherman Act.8
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1970).
2. E.g., Arnold & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.AJ. 655
(1971); Miller & Weil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972);
Morgan, Where Do We Go from Here with Fee Schedules?, 59 A.B.A.J. 1403 (1973);
Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price Fixing: A Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 439 (1973); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Bar Association
Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HAnv. L. Rlv. 971 (1972).
3. E.g., Arnold & Corley, supra note 2.
4. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1974).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974). On the day after
the Fourth Circuit handed down the Goldfarb decision, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice filed a complaint charging the Oregon State Bar with combining
and conspiring "to raise, fix, stabilize, and maintain fees charged by its members . . .
for rendering legal services." United States v. Oregon State Bar, Civil No. 74-362 (D.
Ore., filed May 9, 1974).
7. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
8. This note will discuss only the "learned profession" and "state action" defenses
accepted by the Fourth Circuit in Goldfarb. However, in regard to the interstate com-
merce test, the author is of the opinion that Judge Craven in his dissent correctly articu-
]ated and applied the test for determining when interstate c.mmerce is sufficiently af-
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The Goldfarbs contracted to purchase a home in Reston, Vir-
ginia on October 26, 1971. To finance the purchase, they obtained a
home mortgage, which required that they obtain title insurance. Thus
a title examination of the real estate had to be made by an attorney.
Unable to purchase the services of a Virginia attorney at less than the
rate prescribed by the locally adopted minimum fee schedule, the Gold-
farbs paid an attorney the minimum rate and subsequently instituted a
class action against the Virginia State Bar and three local bar associ-
ations seeking treble damages for violation of the federal antitrust
laws. 9
The United States District Court found that the minimum fee
schedule was a price-fixing agreement, a per se violation of the fed-
eral antitrust laws. 10 Finding a sufficient effect on interstate com-
merce to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the district court
concluded that the Fairfax County Bar Association's adoption and dis-
tribution of a minimum fee schedule was a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act." The court dismissed the action against the Virginia
State Bar because "[Ila its minor role in this matter, the Virginia
State Bar was engaged in state action," and was, therefore, exempt
from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.' 2  The Goldfarbs and the
Fairfax County Bar Association appealed.
The Fourth Circuit unanimously agreed that the action of the
Virginia State Bar did not violate the federal antitrust laws. Judge
Boreman for the majority concluded that the State Bar came within
the state action immunity3 from the antitrust laws set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.14  The court of ap-
peals, however, reversed the district court's decision that the Fairfax
fected to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. 497 F.2d at 21-
23.
9. Two of the local bar associations, the Alexandria Bar Association and the Ar-
lington County Bar Association, agreed to consent judgments prior to the trial of the
case. They were directed by the district court "to cancel their existing minimum fee
schedules and enjoined from adopting, publishing or distributing any future schedules of
suggested or minimum fees." 355 F. Supp. at 492 n.1.
10. Id. at 493-94.
11. Id. at 494, 496.
12. Id. at 496; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); text accompanying
note 50 infra.
13. 497 F.2d at 8-12.
14. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In a concurring and dissenting opinion in Goldfarb,
Judge Craven was unwilling to conclude that the Parker requirements for state action
immunity had been satisfied, but he found that the "minor role" of the Virginia State
Bar in the price-fixing arrangement was insufficient to justify imposition of Sherman Act
liability. 497 F.2d at 21.
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County Bar Association's adoption and publication of a minimum fee
schedule violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.15 Acknowledging that
"the fee schedule and the enforcement mechanism supporting it act
as a substantial restraint upon competition among attorneys practicing
in Fairfax County,"' 6 the court concluded that anticompetitive restraints
on the practice of law are not within the scope of 'the Sherman Act.
The court reasoned that law is a "learned profession" and not a "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the Act.' 7 In addition, the court
of appeals held that the restraining effect of the minimum fee sched-
ule on the interstate business of financing and insuring home mort-
gages was "fortuitous," "incidental," and too "remote" to satisfy the
interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act.'
THE "LEARNED PROFESSION" EXEMPTION
The language of section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that "ev-
ery contract, combination . . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states . . . ." is unlawful.' 9 There
is not express exception for professional activities and the statutory
language is "so expansive that courts have been reluctant to find ex-
ceptions."20  The only extended analysis of the meaning of the word
"trade" in the Sherman Act was made by Chief Judge Groner in
United States v. American Medical Association.' Judge Groner
pointed out that "[tihe phrase 'restraint of trade' had its genesis in the
common-law, and its legal import and significance is declared again
and again in the decisions of English courts. . . as well as in Ameri-
can decisions in many of the States. The Supreme Court has said that
Congress passed the Sherman Act with this common-law background in
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
16. 497 F.2d at 13.
17. Id. at 13-15.
18. Id. at 18-19. Judge Craven dissented from the majority opinion on the Sher-
man Act liability of the local bar association. Id. at 21-24.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
20. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1973). The
Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561
(1944), concluded "if exceptions are to be written into the (Sherman] Act, they must
come from the Congress, not this Court." See generally S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON,
FEDERAL ANrTRusr LAws 35-37 (1968).
21. 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1940), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Su.
preme Court affirmed the result in this case without reaching the question of whether
the term "trade" applies to the professions. See also United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950), in which Mr. Justice Douglas refers
to Chief Judge Groner's "extended analysis and summary of the problem."
19741
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mind."22  At common law an agreement by an individual not to en-
gage in the practice of his occupation, including the "learned profes-
sions," was considered an illegal contract in restraint of trade unless
the court found that the agreement was "reasonable."'2  Since these
"ancillary" restraints14 of trade were, and still are, illegal if unreason-
able,25 it follows that a direct restraint on the practice of a "learned
profession" is also within the scope of the Sherman Act. Judge Gro-
ner concluded that "[the indutiable effect of . . .English and Ameri-
can [cases], is to enlarge the common acceptance of the phrase 'restraint
of trade' to cover all occupations in which men are engaged for a
livelihood." 6
Although the Supreme Court has stated that it is in the "broad sense
that 'trade' is used in the Sherman Act, '27 it has on two occasions side-
stepped the opportunity to determine if "trade" in this "broad sense"
includes the professions.28  In American Medical Association v. United
States,29 the Supreme Court affirmed the result reached by Judge Gro-
ner for the court of appeals. The Court, however, avoided the ques-
tion of whether the practice of medicine is a "trade" within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act by focusing on the fact that the illegal anticom-
petitive activities of the local medical association were directed
against a business engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning
of the Sherman Act.
Seven years later, in United States v. National Association of Real
22. 110 F.2d at 707.
23. Id. at 708.
24. "An ancillary restraint refers to a covenant or a separate contract which is sub-
ordinate to the main lawful purpose of a larger transaction it is designed to effectuate.
Illustrative is a covenant not to compete accompanying the sale of a business or profes-
sional practice or a contract of employment." S. OPPENHEim & G. WEsrON, supra note
20, at 4.
25. See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 709 (D.C. Cir.
1940), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 476
(1940). See generally Note, Professional Responsibility-Covenants Not to Compete
Between Attorneys, 50 N.C.L Rav. 936 (1972). See also N.C. STATE BAR COon OF
PRoEssIoNAL REsPoNsmmr DR2-108(A) which makes it a disciplinary violation for
an attorney to "be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment agreement
with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termina-
tion of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment of
retirement benefits."
26. 110 F.2d at 710.
27. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491
(1950); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
28. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.,S. 5191 528 (1943),
,9, 317 U.S. 519 (1943),
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Estate Boards,30 the Supreme Court again sidestepped the "learned
profession" issue. The Court stated:
We do not intimate an opinion on the correctness of the applica-
tion of the term "trade" to the professions. We have said enough
to indicate we would be contracting the scope of the concept of
"trade," as used in the phrase "restraint of trade," in a precedent-
breaking manner if we carved out an exemption for real estate
brokers. Their activity is commercial and carried on for profit.3 '
The Supreme Court's failure to consider the validity of the
"learned profession" exemption has allowed the professions to focus on
three older Supreme Court decisions in supporting a claim of Sherman
Act exemption. In Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs,12 the Supreme Court
held that professional baseball was not subject to the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act, in part because the Court found that "personal ef-
fort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. '33  Al-
though the Supreme Court has on two occasions affirmed its decision
in Federal Base Ball,34 the Court in Flood v. Kuhns5 explained that
Federal Base Ball and its progeny are "aberration[s] confined to
baseball. ' 6  In two other decisions, Federal Trade Commission v.
Raladam Co.37 and Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 8
the Supreme Court in dicta stated that the "learned professions" are
not "trades" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The dicta in
these two cases "decided in an era of judicial antagonism to govern-
mental regulation of business and commerce" 39 stand as the only af-
firmative support for an exclusion of the "learned professions" from
the scope of the Sherman Act.
Until the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldfarb, no court has found
enough vitality in the "learned profession" exemption to base a dis-
30. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
31. Id. at 491-92.
32. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
33. Id. at 209.
34. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953).
35. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
36. Id. at 282. The arguments of other professional sports organizations that they
come within the scope of the exemption granted to baseball in Federal Base Ball have
been uniformly rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
37. 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
38. 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932).
39. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 23 (4th Cir. 1974) (dissenting
opinion).
1974]
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missal of charges of antitrust violations primarily on this defense.40 In
Northern California Pharmaceutical Association v. United States4
and United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Association, 2 lower courts
imposed Sherman Act liability on professional groups. Those courts
found that the "commercial" aspects of the alleged anticompetitive
professional activities brought the professionals within the scope of the
Sherman Act.43 At the same time, because of the Supreme Court's dicta
relating to the professions, no court has declared that the exemption
does not exist.
The Goldfarb majority argued that the traditional belief in an
exemption for the "learned professions," as evidenced by dicta in Ral-
adam and Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, is entitled to great weight.41
In the court's opinion, to overturn this traditional belief would amount
to judicial legislation.45  While this argument is analogous to that
made by the Supreme Court in justifying the continued vitality of Fed-
eral Base Ball,40 the "learned profession" exemption does not share
the history of professional baseball's exemption. The "learned pro-
fession" exclusion is supported only by dicta, while baseball's exemp-
tion is supported by three affirmative Supreme Court decisions. Faced
since 1922 with baseball's "aberrational," judicially granted exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws, Congress has failed to pass remedial leg-
islation. The Supreme Court has found that this is "something other
than mere Congressional silence and passivity," concluding "that Con-
gress as yet has had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to
the reach of the antitrust statutes. '4 7  In contrast, the dicta support-
ing the "learned profession" exemption has not stood as a red flag in-
viting affirmative Congressional action to close a gap in Sherman Act
40. E.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soe'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir.
1957), the court of appeal's opinion was based primarily on the absence of interstate
commerce, but the court included a statement that "the practice of [medicine] . ..is
neither trade nor commerce within Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Id. at 268.
41. 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
42. 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
43. Both cases involved agreements among pharmacists to fix the prices of pre-
scriptions. See Alabama Optometric Ass'n v. Alabama State Bd. of Health, 5 TRADE
RE. REP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.) 1 68,914 (M.D. Ala. July 26, 1974). Cf. Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), in which the court
concluded that "an incidental restraint of trade absent an intent or purpose to affect the
commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant application of the anti-
trust laws." Id. at 654.
44. 497 F.2d at 19.
45. Id.
46. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
47. Id. at 283.
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coverage. The reach of the Sherman Act has continued to expand
into areas at one time thought to enjoy professional immunity,48 while
the Congress has done nothing to stop this extension.
The Fourth Circuit also found justification for the "learned pro-
fession" exemption on the basis of extensive state regulation of the le-
gal profession.49 State regulation, however, brings immunity only if
the requirements of Parker v. Brown5" are met. The "learned" or
"unlearned" nature of the activity regulated by the state has never been
a consideration in the analysis of a claim of Parker immunity. If the
"learned professions" are to enjoy immunity from the federal antitrust
laws because of "the special form of regulation already imposed upon
those in the legal profession," that "special regulation" must meet the
requirements for "state action" immunity set out by the Supreme
Court.
STATE ACTION
In Parker the Supreme Court concluded ,that there is "nothing in
the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activi-
ties directed by its legislature."51  The Court held that the California
Raisin Prorate Program, an anticompetitive agricultural marketing
scheme, did not violate the Sherman Act. The program "derived its
authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the state,"
and it was executed and enforced by state officials.
Since Parker, the Supreme Court has failed to refine its definition
of the scope of the "state action" immunity. Although Parker dealt
specifically with immunity for state officials acting under the mandate
of legislative command, the case has been interpreted to confer anti-
trust immunity on private persons who engage in anticompetitive ac-
tivities under a similar mandate.52 When extending the Parker ex-
emption to activities of private parties, the lower courts have agreed
48. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Department of
Justice has been very successful in recent years in getting consent decrees in cases it
has brought against professional groups challenging their fee setting arrangements. Cf.
United States v. American Institute of Architects, 1972 Trade Cas. 92,091 (D.D.C.);
United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 1972 Trade Cas. 91,972 (S.D.N.Y.).
49. 497 F.2d at 14-15.
50. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
.51. Id. at 350-51.
52. See Kintner & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23
AM. U.L. Rv. 527, 530 (1974).
1974]
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that the proposition that there was government participation "only be-
gins the analysis, for it is not every governmental act that points a
path to an antitrust shelter.""
The anticompetitive activities must be specifically authorized by
legislative command and aimed at achieving some legitimate state ob-
jective. 54 In addition, the activities of the private parties must be
"actively supervised" by independent state officials. 5  General su-
pervision over the private parties is not sufficient to invoke "state ac-
tion" immunity in the majority of federal courts.50
In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 57
the Fourth Circuit departed significantly from this standard. The
court rejected an argument that the "active supervision" requirement of
Parker was not satisfied because the Virginia State Corporation Com-
mission had not affirmatively approved promotional practices of
VEPCO alleged to violate the Sherman Act. The court stated: "The
argument is not without merit but the conclusion is not inevitable un-
less one equates administrative silence with abandonment of adminis-
trative duty. It is just as sensible to infer that silence means consent,
i.e., approval."' 8  The conclusion of ,the Fourth Circuit that the po-
tential for state regulation satisfies the "active supervision" require-
ment of Parker has been characterized by one court as an "unwar-
ranted hyperextension of Parker."' 9  The Fifth Circuit in Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co."0 expressly declined to adopt the Washing-
ton Gas Light reasoning. The court stated: "The Parker exclusion
applies to the rates and practices of public utilities enjoying monopoly
status under state policy when their rates and practices are subjected
53. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1294 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
54. E.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d
25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
55. E.g., Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
1971).
56. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Kintner & Kaufman, supra note 52, at 533.
57. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
58. Id. at 252.
59. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp.
1153 (D. Hawaii 1972). See also Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444
F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir. 1971); Note, State Action Exemption-Potential State Regula-
tory Control Exempts Private Party-Tying Arrangements-Reduction in Price of
Buried Power Lines for Builders Installing Major Electrical Appliances Does Not Con-
stitute a Tie-In, 85 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1972).
60. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
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to meaningful regulation and supervision by the state to the end that
they are the result of the considered judgment of the state regulatory
authority ....
Assuming arguendo that Washington Gas Light is a correct appli-
cation of Parker,2 Goldfarb remains an unwarranted extension of
"state action" immunity. In Washington Gas Light the state regulatory
agency was directed by statute to fix the rate structure of public utili-
ties." In addition, the anticompetitive practices complained of in
Washington Gas Light were reviewed and disapproved by the regula-
tory agency after the antitrust action had been filed, but prior to the
court's decision."" In Goldfarb the Virginia Supreme Court had no
mandate to impose or approve fixed fee schedules for Virginia attor-
neys. Furthermore, there was no prior or subsequent approval or dis-
approval of the price-fixing arrangements. 65
The statutes that granted power to the Virginia Supreme Court
and the Virginia State Bar to regulate the practice of law in Virginia
did not authorize or direct the state agencies to approve or disapprove
61. Id. at 1140. Georgia Power is in line with the interpretation of the Parker
"active supervision" requirement reached by the majority of lower courts. See Kintner
& Kaufman, supra note 52, at 530.
62. The validity of this assumption has been questioned by other courts. E.g., Gas
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
351 F. Supp. 1153, 1202 (D. Hawaii 1972).
63. 438 F.2d at 251.
64. Id. at 252.
65. Judge Craven, who wrote the Washington Gas Light opinion, although concur-
ring in the majority's result in Goldfarb as to the State Bar, did not agree that the State
Bar was excluded from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown. He concluded that the
Virginia Supreme Court would be "surprised to learn that it is engaged in active super-
vision of the State Bar's implementation of minimum fee schedules in Virginia." 497
F.2d at 21. Judge Craven concluded that the State Bar should not be subject to Sherman
Act liability because of the "exceedingly 'minor role' of the State Bar in this matter."
In reaching this result Judge Craven looked to the Supreme Court's decision in National
Association of Real Estate Boards, in which the Court affirmed the district court's de-
cision that the National Association did not share the Sherman Act liability of the
Washington Real Estate Board. The Supreme Court concluded that although "we might
give the facts another construction . . . and find a more sinister cast to its actions ... ,
we cannot say that the District Court was clearly erroneous in finding that the National
Association . . . was not laced into the conspiracy to fix commissions." 339 U.S. at
495. In Goldfarb the district court did not find that the State Bar's "minor" involvement
in the implementation of the minimum fee schedules by the Fairfax County Bar Associa-
tion was insufficient to justify imposition of Sherman Act liability. Instead it concluded
that in its minor role the Virginia State Bar was engaged in immune state action. The
state action immunity is discounted by Judge Craven in his dissenting opinion. To char-
acterize the threat of disciplinary action against those who failed to follow the local bar
associations' minimum fee schedules as "minor," gives very little weight to the enforce-
ment aspect of the alleged price-fixing agreement.
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minimum fee schedules.6 6  Although the parties stipulated that ",the
Virginia statutes have given the Virginia court authority to make
questions involving suggested minimum fee schedules . . . questions
of ethics under the laws of Virginia, '6 7 Judge Craven in his dissent cor-
rectly pointed out that the trial court expressly rejected this stipulation
as "a conclusion of law rather than a fact."6  Absent an express
legislative declaration commanding anticompetitive behavior as a part
of the regulatory scheme, courts have been very reluctant to imply a
grant of immunity from antitrust liability.6 9
CONCLUSION
The Goldfarb decision places unwarranted restraints on the
scope of the federal antitrust laws. The decision breathes new life
and respectability into the ,"learned professions" claim of antitrust
exemption, a claim that is supported only by antiquated dicta of the
United States Supreme Court. Neither the modem decisions of the
Supreme Court nor the common-law history of the phrase "restraint of
trade" supports such an exemption. Judicial recognition of an anti-
trust exemption for the "learned professions" can only lead courts into
the quagmire of determining in future cases which professions are
"learned" and which are "unlearned." Because -the policy of pro-
hibiting price-fixing agreements is vital to the nation, the federal anti-
trust laws implementing that policy should apply to the profession
largely entrusted with enforcement of those laws.
66. VA. CoDE ANN. § 54-48 (1972), as amended (Supp. 1974) provides:
The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, pro-
mulgate and amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of at-
torneys at law and a code of judicial ethics.
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring at-
torneys at law.
67. 497 F.2d at 9.
68. Id. at 20.
69. See generally Semke v. Enid Automotive Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th
Cir. 1972); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.
1970); George R. Whitten, Jr. Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1970). This interpretation of the scope of the Parker "state action" immunity is sup-
ported by a long line of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the antitrust liability of
federally regulated industries. In those cases the Court concluded that absent an express
Congressional exemption from the federal antitrust laws, implied exemptions are "strong-
ly disfavored" and will only be found in cases of "plain repugnancy between the antitrust
and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
350-51 (1963). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973);
Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Governmental Action, 48 TuL. L. Rav.
272 (1974).
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If the learned professions are to enjoy immunity from liability
when engaging in anticompetitive activities that would otherwise vio-
late the federal antitrust laws, that immunity must be found in the
Parker "state action" doctrine. Parker, however, requires much more
than a stipulation that the legislature granted a state regulatory agency
power to sanction generally price-fixing arrangements and an inference
that failure to act amounts to "active supervision." If allowed to
stand, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldfarb will mark a signifi-
cant erosion of the scope of the Sherman Act.70
GEoRGF T. RoGISTER, JR.
Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Amending Rule 23 in Response
to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
The federal class action1 has been praised as a device that pro-
vides for the small claimant a means of obtaining redress for injuries
to his legally protected rights.' Without this device many wrongs that
are too small in relation to the cost of obtaining relief would go un-
remedied.3 Recently, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin4 the United
70. The North Carolina State Bar and the North Carolina Bar Association have
acted to foreclose antitrust suits similar to those in the instant case. In 1972, prior to
the district court decision in Goldfarb, the State Bar repealed paragraph three of the
Canon of Ethics Number 12 relating to the use by attorneys of minimum fee schedules.
In addition, the State Bar rescinded all ethics opinions that discussed or related to mini-
mum fee schedules. At the same time, the North Carolina Bar Association eliminated
from its Advisory Handbook on Office Management and Fees the schedule of fees for
specific services. Many local bar associations in North Carolina have followed suit and
have also wisely eliminated minimum fee schedules. Sitton, Professional Liability, 25
BAtR NOTES 84, 96-97 (1974).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
Rpm. 501 (1969); Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANi-
TRUST L.J. 295 (1966); Kaplan, Class Action Symposium, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. RPv. 497 (1969); Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-
Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. Lkw. 1259 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941).
4. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
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States Supreme Court sharply limited the extent to which the class ac-
tion may be used. The Eisen case was a private antitrust suit initi-
ated in 1966.5 Because his claim was too small to make an individ-
ual suit profitable and because there were many other potential plain-
tiffs,6 Morton Eisen sought to maintain the suit as a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).7 This created consider-
able litigation in the federal district and appellate courts." In 1974
5. Eisen alleged that the defendant brokerage firms had conspired to fix the odd-
lot differential at an excessive level in violation of the Sherman Act. (The odd-lot dif-
ferential is the charge levied on the odd-lot trader in addition to the standard brokerage
commission. An odd-lot trader is one who buys or sells securities in lots of less than
a hundred.) Eisen claimed to represent all odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Ex-
change during a four-year period. The Exchange was also made a defendant. Id. at
2144.,
6. See note 18 infra.
7. Rule 23(b) provides as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy ...
Eisen also tried to qualify under subdivisions (1) and (2), but the court of appeals held
that they were inapplicable. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564
(2d Cir. 1968). See also text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
8. The district court originally denied class action status for three reasons: (1)
The plaintiff could not adequately protect the interests of the class. (2) Common ques-
tions did not predominate over questions of interest to only certain members of the class.
(3) The requirement of individual notice to all known class members could not be ful-
filled. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 150-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). On remand from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
however, the district court allowed the suit to proceed as a class action. Despite the
specific notice requirement of subdivision (c) (2) of rule 23, the court proposed a scheme
of notification that fell short of complete individual notice. The elements of the notice
were as follows: (1) individual notice to all member firms of the New York Stock Ex-
change and to commercial banks with large trust departments; (2) individual notice to
identifiable class members with at least ten odd-lot transactions during the period; (3)
individual notice to five thousand additional class members selected at random; and (4)
publication notice in the Wall Street Journal and other newspapers in New York and
California. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). De-
fendants appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that rule 23 required indi-
vidual notice to all members who could be identified with reasonable effort. Eisen v.
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the controversy reached the Supreme Court.9 The Court held that sub-
division (c)(2)10 of rule 23 requires that individual, mailed notice of
a class action brought pursuant to subdivision (b)(3) of the rule must
be provided to every member of the class who can be identified with
reasonable effort.'1
The Court supported its literal reading of the rule by observing
that the notice requirement for (b)(3) class actions had been added
by the Rules' Advisory Committee in 1966 in order to satisfy what the
Committee perceived as the requirements of due process12 established
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'3  The Court, how-
ever, expressed no opinion on whether due process requires individual
notice to all known class members.' 4
In light of the history' 5 and the express language of rule 23,16
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140
(1974). In addition, the court of appeals held that Eisen was required to bear the initial
cost of such notice as part of the usual burden of financing his own suit. Id.
9. In challenging the notice requirement, Eisen contended that the cost of indi-
vidual notice was so prohibitive that it would preclude him from proceeding with the
class action. 94 S. Ct. at 2151. In addition, he argued that individual notice was unnec-
essary because no class member would desire to proceed individually and because, in any
event, he would adequately represent their interests. Id.
10. Subdivision (c) (2) provides as follows:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
The mandatory notice requirement does not apply to subdivisions (b) (1) and
(b) (2).
11. 94 S. Ct. at 2152. The Court also agreed with the court of appeals that the
representative was required to pay for the notice. It distinguished lower court cases
holding otherwise on the ground that they presented situations in which the defendant
owed a fiduciary duty to the class members. Id. at 2153. A case discussing exceptional
circumstances under which the defendant may be required to pay some or all of the cost
of notice is Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498-500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
12. 94 S. Ct. at 2150-51.
13. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "Where the names and post-office addresses of those
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency." Id. at 318; see Schroeder v. City
of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962). See note 29 infra for the facts of the Mul-
lane case.
14. 94 S. Ct. at 2152. The Court's opinion gives the impression that at this point
it tends toward agreeing with the Committee's analysis of Mullane. See id. at 2150-
52. This analysis, however, is not necessarily correct. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 313 (2d ed. 1970). This Note will attempt to demon-
strate that Mullane does not control.
15. Originally the rule was designed to provide a method for consolidating a large
mimbe of existing or imminent l ?ti ito 9ne action. Beclise the 195$ version Qf
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the Eisen decision as it pertains to the notice requirement is undoubt-
edly correct. Nevertheless, the decision will certainly have a significant
impact upon the use of the federal class action.' 7  Requiring individ-
ual notice to all known class members will dramatically increase the
cost of the procedure,' 8 thus reducing the number of people who can
afford to bring a class action. Because the procedure is most needed
when the expense of litigation is greater than the size of any potential
individual recovery, 19 the effect will be to deny a remedy to small
claimants who cannot afford to sue individually.2 0 Pressure will un-
doubtedly develop to avoid the consequences of the decision.
the rule did not accomplish this objective consistently (primarily because of problems
in determining who was bound by a decision), see Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musi-
cians, 372 F.2d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 99 (1968), the Committee
drafted the present version to give the court power to determine the scope of a judg-
ment. They provided that all members of a class would be included in any judgment,
favorable or unfavorable. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3). The Committee felt, however,
that in a (b) (3) class action the individual class members' interests in conducting their
own suits were likely to be so great that due process would not allow them to be bound
unless they were first given a chance to exclude themselves from the class or to partici-
pate in the proceeding. Relying on Mullane, the Committee decided that the minimum
acceptable notice to known (b) (3) class members was individual, mailed notice. Pro-
posed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104-05 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as
Committee's Note]. They did not feel, however, that the other categories of the rule
were subject to the same requirement, although it is difficult to find a distinction of any
substance in regard to the rights being affected. It is true that (b) (1) and (b) (2) are
aimed at situations in which the class members' interests are more likely to be inter-
twined. That factor, however, should determine whether the suit is eligible for class ac-
tion treatment, not what form of notice is required once such treatment is found proper.
It is also true that (b) (1) and especially (b) (2) are designed for situations in
which some type of injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate. See id. at 100. The
right to such relief, however, is just as real as the right to compensatory relief. There
is no reason to require stricter notice as a prerequisite to foreclosing one right than the
other. The rule gives the court discretion to order whatever notice it deems necessary
to protect the (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members. No more is necessary to protect the
(b) (3) class members.
16. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2), quoted in note 10 supra.
17. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1022 (Oakes, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); Pomerantz, supra note 2, at 1263.
18. There were over six million members in Eisen, of whom 2,250,000 could be
identified with reasonable effort. 94 S. Ct. at 2147. The cost of providing notice would
have been $315,000. Id. at 2147 n.7. Eisen's individual claim was only seventy dollars.
Id. at 2144.
19. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977(1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 1971); Ford, supra note 2, at 501; Frankel, supra note 2, at 295; Kaplan, supra
note 2, at 497; Pomerantz, supra note 2, at 1259.
20. This effect will be greatest in areas of the law where litigation is likely to be
lengthy and complex-for example, in the antitrust and securities areas. Because of the
great amount of federal law in these areas, they are likely candidates for class actions
brought under rule 23.
The fact that attorneys' fees are often allowed in this area may not help the indi-
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One possible course available to future class action plaintiffs21
would be to attempt to qualify their suits under one of the other cate-
gories of rule 23(b),22 for which the rule does not require individual
notice. These categories, however, will not prove helpful in the ma-
jority of cases in which numerous small claimants are seeking com-
pensatory relief. For example, subdivision (b)(1)(A) was designed
to cover the situation in which separate suits might establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the defendant.23 Similarly, subdivi-
sion (b)(1)(B) was intended to cover situations in which separate ac-
tions would, in effect, either dispose of the interests of class members
not parties to the actions or substantially impair their ability to protect
their own interest.2 4  Neither subdivision will apply in the typical suit
for damages. Furthermore, although it would be possible in many
instances to qualify under subdivision (b)(2), the only remedy avail-
able under that subdivision is injunctive or declaratory relief.2 5
The possibility of qualifying the suit under one of the other categories
of subsection (b), therefore, offers little promise to those who seek an
alternativeito the (b)(3) class action.
In light of the problems presented by this and other possible
alternatives,2 the best way to avoid the consequences of Eisen is to
vidual, because the court will probably not award a very large fee in a case where the
recovery is very small. Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 87 HAnv. L. R1v. 426, 436 (1973).
21. Although rule 23 allows a class to be either a plaintiff or a defendant, this
Note is primarily concerned with the former situation, which has generally been more
common.
22. See note 7 supra.
23. See Committee's Note at 100. The defendant usually must owe a duty to the
class members, not merely be guilty of having injured them in the past.
24. An example of such a situation is where defendant is unable to satisfy all of
plaintiffs' claims. See id. at 100-01.
25. Id. at 102. The court of appeals in Eisen suggested that this may be preferable
to suing for damages. 479 F.2d at 1019-20. This view is questionable if the desire is
to use the class action to provide redress for injuries. (The fact that the rule was not
created for such purpose should not prevent it from being used in that manner when
it is the best method.)
26. Another possible course is to petition the court for an order directing the de-
fendant to pay for some or all of the notice. As a result of Eisen, however, this would
require proving the existence of a fiduciary relation between the defendant and the class.
See note 11 supra. Even if the relation can be established, the Supreme Court has not
indicated whether it will allow the cost of notice to be allocated. See 94 S. Ct. at 2153
n.15.
A more interesting alternative was suggested by Justice Douglas in his partial dis-
sent in Eisen. He suggested dividing the class into smaller subclasses pursuant to sub-
divison (c) (4) of rule 23. Although Justice Douglas was optimistic about the possibility
of success with this option, he raised several unanswered questions with regard to its
use. For example, he noted the existence of questions concerning the collateral estoppel
effects of a judgment in the first action on subsequent suits by other class members or
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amend rule 23 to eliminate the mandatory notice requirement for ac-
tions brought under subdivision (b)(3). This alternative is not with-
out problems, however. Many seem to share the Advisory Commit-
tee's apparent belief that the rule's notice requirement is constitution-
ally compelled, agreeing with the Committee's interpretation of Mul-
lane. This interpretation, however, is not necessarily correct for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee 28 recognized
that, if absent class members were adequately represented by the plain-
tiff in a class action, they could be bound by the judgment rendered.
Secondly, the Mullane situation can be distinguished in two critical
respects from the typical class action situation, and, therefore, Mul-
lane may not control the type of notice that rule 23 must require.
The first distinction is that, although Mullane did, in a non-
technical sense, involve a party representing a class, 20 the representa-
tive had no interest in common with the class members. As a result,
there was less assurance that he would adequately represent their in-
terests.30 The philosophy of rule 23, on the other hand, is that the
subclasses. He also pointed out that it is not clear whether an action initiated by a sub-
class will toll the statute of limitations for the entire class. Id. at 2153-57 (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part).
There are also potential problems that Justice Douglas did not mention. For exam-
ple, the only situation mentioned by the Advisory Committee in its comments to subdi-
vision (c) (4) was one in which different segments of the class had divergent interests,
so that both segments could not be adequately represented by the same individual. Al-
though the rule does not expressly limit the use of subclasses to such situations, the dan-
ger exists that the courts may formulate a judicial limitation.
Some additional questions concern whether the representative of the first subclass
could also represent the second after a judgment is reached in the first suit; whether
the recovery from a favorable judgment in the first suit could be used to finance the
required notice to the remaining class members; and whether the defendant, having been
found liable once, could be required to pay for notice to the remaining class members.
None of these questions have been answered. Therefore, this alternative is of question-
able value at this time.
27. See, e.g., Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10
B.C. ism. & COM. L. REv. 557, 560 (1969).
28. 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). Because Mullane can be distinguished from Hans-
berry, the former cannot be said to have overruled the latter. See text accompanying
notes 29-31 infra.
29. In Mullane the trustee of a large trust fund brought an action pursuant to a
New York statute to have the trust accounts covering a prior period approved. The
court appointed a special guardian as directed by the statute to represent the interests
of absent beneficiaries of the fund. The representative contested the action, contending
that the form of publication notice of the proceeding prescribed by the statute did not
comply with the requirements of due process because it was not reasonably calculated
to provide them with actual notice of the proceeding. The Supreme Court held that,
as to known and locatable beneficiaries, individual, mailed notice was required by due
process. 339 U.S. at 318.
30. See Comment, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-Th? Notic Rt?"-
quirement, 29 MD. L. RFEv. 139, 145 (1969),
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representative can be counted upon to protect adequately the interests
of the class members because he shares common interests with them.3 1
Secondly, the suit in Mullane was brought by a potential adver-
sary of the class in order to extinguish the class members' rights to sue
him. The class action, however, is brought by a proponent of the
class in order to satisfy the class members' rights to a day in court.
Cases applying Mullane and adhering to a strict notice require-
ment 2 can even more easily be distinguished from the typical class ac-
tion. Like Mullane, they involved adversary situations in which no-
tice was necessary to ensure that the individual's case would be
pressed before the court. 3 Those cases are further distinguishable
from the class action, because there was no one to represent the indi-
vidual not receiving notice in the event that he did not appear himself.
In the class action, however, the individual's case is argued before the
court by the representative of the class. If the representation is in-
adequate to protect the individual's interest, redress can be afforded
collaterally without requiring individual notice in every situation.34
Because Mullane and its line of cases developed the notice re-
quirement without reference to the class action, that requirement
should not be blindly applied to the procedure. Such an application
is inconsistent with -the general flexibility of due process.3 5 Rather, a
due process notice requirement should be formulated that is consist-
ent with the goals of 'the class action and the interests of the parties in-
volved. To do this, the interests of the public, the absent class mem-
31. Committee's Note at 100.
32. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545 (1965); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Lambert v. Califor-
nia, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); City
of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); Standard Oil Co.
v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
33. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of uninsured motor-
ist's driver's license); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (adoption proceeding
against the interest of the natural father); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956) (condemnation proceeding); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
344 U.S. 293 (1953) (bankruptcy reorganization affecting creditors).
34. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Frankel, Some Preliminary Obser-
vations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46 (1967); Note, Clas Action Treat-
ment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASh. L. Rlv. 1150,
1166-67 (1968).
35. The Supreme Court itself recognized this flexibility in Mullane by allowing
mailed notice instead of the more expensive personal service. Note, 87 HARV, L, IEv.,
supra note 20, at 438,
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ber, and the defendant should be considered. The public's interest is
to encourage the use of class actions as a procedure through which
the small claimant can obtain redress for his injuries.8  The absent
class member's interests are to sue separately, to participate in the
conduct of the class action, or, if he does neither, to be adequately rep-
resented by those actively involved in the suit. Finally, the interest of
the defendant is to know-at the time the suit begins-the probable
extent of the judgment.3T
In balancing these interests, the rule should provide for the public
interest to the greatest extent possible without sacrificing the neces-
sary protection of the individuals involved. The most effective way
in which the rule can further the public interest is to decrease as much
as possible the costs involved in bringing a class action. This can be
done by requiring, in appropriate cases, a less expensive form of no-
tice or even no notice at all.
In considering what notice is necessary to protect the absent class
member's interest in suing separately, the size of his claim and the ex-
pense of litigation are the most important factors. If the expense is
greater than the potential recovery,38 the class member's interest, if he
has one, in suing separately is minimal. Because he cannot expect to
profit by suing individually, the existence of a class action is, in a
sense, a windfall to him. 9 Therefore, his need to participate directly
or to question the adequacy of representation in the class action is
likewise minimal. Under such circumstances, notice, as an absolute
condition to maintenance of the class action, should not be required
for him. In the unlikely event that he does desire to sue separately, it
is more consistent with the balancing concept of due process to allow
him to raise the issue of lack of notice or of inadequate representation
in a later proceeding than to abort the class action because the repre-
36. But see note 52 infra.
37. The defendant also has an interest in not being subjected to frivolous suits by
plaintiffs hoping to force settlements. Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005,
1018-19 (2d Cir. 1973). This consideration, however, does not go to the question of
what notice should be required once the suit is begun. Other safeguards may need to
be developed to protect defendants from this very real danger.
38. This determination could be made at a preliminary hearing. If the court is
unable to satisfy itself that a potential class member has no practical interest in suing
separately, it should proceed as if he did have such interest.
39. It is a windfall to him only in the sense that, as the law is now, without the
class action he cannot effect a net recovery. To the extent that he has a legitimate
claim, the class action merely affords him the opportunity to assert his existing right
to recover. However, given the fact that the class member cannot recover without the
class action, inadequate representation will leave him in no worse position, from a prac-
tical standpoint, than he would have been had the class action never been brought.
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sentative cannot afford the cost of providing notice. On the other
hand, if the potential recovery exceeds the cost of litigation, the class
member's interest in suing separately, in participating, or in being
adequately represented is substantial. For him some type of notice
should be required. Although publication notice has its shortcomings, 40
the rule should, nevertheless, give the court discretion to decide whether,
in a given situation, such notification satisfies due process. 4' Further-
more, when the class is very large, the need for complete individual
notice may be less significant because of -the greater possibility that
something less will reach people representative of all views within the
class.42 There may also be situations in which the class is so homo-
geneous that a particular form of notice-such as individual notice to
organizations or individuals who can reasonably be expected to com-
municate directly with all or a great majority of the class members-
will be adequate.43
By providing notice to those class members with substantial po-
tential interests in suing separately and by ensuring that the represen-
tative adequately protects their interests, the court will protect the inter-
est of the defendant as well. He will know that those members who
might be expected to sue separately or to object to the representation
have been given an opportunity to do so, and, therefore, are bound by
the judgment unless they excluded themselves from the class. In addi-
tion, he will know that ,the only class members not given individual no-
tice are those who would find it unprofitable to sue individually. Al-
though those class members would not be bound by the judgment,
there is little danger that they would attempt to sue separately after an
40. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 117 (1956); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
41. The court is presently given that discretion with respect to class actions
brought under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), so the Advisory Committee has demon-
strated that it does not consider such discretion beyond the province of the court. See
FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 (d).
42. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 396 (1967). There is also
language in the opinion in Mullane that recognizes that less than perfect notice may
be acceptable. See 339 U.S. at 319.
43. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Comment, 29 MD. L. REv., supra note 30, at
148. This is the theory upon which the district court based its notification scheme in
Eisen. See note 8 supra. The court reasoned that, because all class members had in-
vested in securities, individual notice to brokerage firms and banks with large trust de-
partments, plus publication notice in financial newspapers, would be adequate to notify
those class members with substantial interests in suing separately.
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unfavorable judgment."
The possibility of foreclosing without notice a person's right to
conduct his own suit, however insubstantial this right may be, is,
without doubt, unacceptable to some. The answer to such objections
is that the present rule causes a much greater inequity. It forecloses
the substantial rights of an entire class to protect the relatively insub-
stantial rights of a segment of that class.4" Furthermore, there are
other areas of the law in which individual rights are foreclosed with-
out notice or with less than perfect notice. For example, statutes of
limitations operate without notice to cut off rights of action. Yet
they have been upheld against due process challenges. 40 In addition,
people are charged with knowledge of criminal and civil statutes, al-
though they may have received no actual notice of -their existence.47
Furthermore, the rule of stare decisis affects ,the rights of absent in-
dividuals without notice.4" Also the Uniform Commercial Code al-
lows creditors to repossess goods from the allegedly defaulting buyer-
debtor without notice or a prior hearing. 49 Even in Mullane the possi-
bility of less than one hundred percent individual notice was ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court. Thus, there is adequate precedent
for limiting individual rights without perfect individual notice.
44. There is evidence that a very small percentage of those class members who
have received notice under rule 23 (c) (2) have asked to be excluded from the class. Fur-
thermore, not one of the individuals who requested exclusion brought his own suit. This
is a strong indication that no rights would actually be affected by not providing notice
in limited circumstances. Pomerantz, supra note 2, at 1266; cf. Berland v. Mack, 48
F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45. In fact, under the guise of protecting the members' rights to sue, the rule
takes away from them the only realistic method presently available for recovering
at all. The right to sue individually is worthless if it cannot be afforded. The rule
also "vitiate[s] the class action device in situations where application thereof as a matter
of public policy can be important, such as private antitrust, consumer, and environmental
litigation." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. See, e.g., Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. REA, 321 U.S. 342 (1944); Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F.B. Williams
Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 190 (1922); Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Hazard, A Gen-
eral Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. C. REv. 241, 288. The class action
shortens the limitation period somewhat, but does not take away the right to recover.
47. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S.
241 (1907).
48. Frankel, supra note 34, at 46.
49. Umwo omn CoMMmRcAL CODE § 9-503. Recent decisions have put the constitu.
tionality of this provision in doubt. The reason, however, is not the lack of notice so
much as the fact that it allows the debtor to be deprived of property without the benefit
of any representation in a judicial proceeding. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). The situation in the class action is different. There is a full judicial proceed-
ing, and the members of the class must be adequately represented,
0, .e note 42 supra,
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Although the Supreme Court will have to retreat somewhat from
the absolute wording of Mullane to uphold the constitutionality of a
rule that does not require individual notice in all cases to known per-
sons, rule 23 should, nevertheless, be amended, 51 and the Court
should uphold it.52  Cases such as Eisen, although decided correctly
under the present rule, demonstrate -the need for a device that will help
to create "a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well
as -to those liberally endowed with power and wealth. 15 3
PRCHiARD G. CHANEY
Constitutional Law-Executive Privilege: Tilting the Scales in
Favor of Secrecy
Executive privilege is a concept invoked by members of the
executive branch of the government -to justify withholding evidence and
other communicative materials from the legislative and judicial
branches.' Since 17922 debate surrounding the doctrine has been pre-
51. The amended rule should make no distinction between subdivision (b) (3) and
subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2) with regard to the notice requirement. It would still
be appropriate, however, to require the court to find that the class action is the best
available means for handling the controversy. See note 52 infra. The court will also
have discretion under subsection (d) to direct that notice be provided to the class mem-
bers when the court feels it is necessary.
52. Not everyone agrees that the class action is the best method for dealing with
antitrust and securities actions involving a very large number of potential claimants.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated,
94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Kaplan, supra note 42, at 394; H. FRiENDLY, FEDERAL JURIS-
DicTIoN: A GENERAL Vmw 118-20 (1973). Although arguments against such use of
the class action may have merit, they should not be determinative of the notice required
by due process once the court has determined that no better method exists for handling
the controversy, as it must under subdivision (b) (3). One factor in the determination
may be the possible necessity for future notice to the class members for the purpose of
filing proofs of loss after the defendant is found liable. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968). This possibility alone, however, should not
preclude use of the class action. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726
(1967). In fact, in such a situation it-may be possible to require the defendant to fi-
nance the notice. Comment, 29 MD. L. Rv., supra note 30, at 157.
53. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2157 (1974) (Douglas, I., dis-
senting).
1. Cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.DC.
1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
2. In refusing to turn over documents requested by Congress in its inquiry into
a disastrous military expedition against a tribe of Indians, President Washington con-
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dominated by three questions. First, is executive privilege consti-
tutionally based? Secondly, who is the final judge of the validity of
any assertion of the privilege? Thirdly, assuming that the judiciary has
the power to review such assertions, what is the scope of the privilege,
and what guidelines will be used to determine whether, in a given case,
the assertion of the privilege is warranted? 3 In United States v. Nixon4
a unanimous5 Supreme Court gave its first definitive answers to these
questions. The Court held that, while the privilege is rooted in the
Constitution, the courts, and not the Executive, must be the final
arbiters of the scope and the validity of any claim of executive privilege.
The case arose out of an unusual chain of events. On March 1,
1974, a federal grand jury investigating the case of United States v.
Mitchell" indicted seven individuals7 for conspiracy to obstruct justice
and to defraud the United States. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor s
was granted a -third-party subpoena duces tecum, pursuant to Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 17(c), requiring the pre-trial production
of certain tape recordings and documents that were in the President's
possession. In response, counsel for the President filed a motion to
quash the subpoena, accompanied by a formal claim of privilege. The
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion to quash
tended that "the executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would
permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public."
STAFF OF SUBCOMm. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDI-
cIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., MEMOS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE PowFR OF
THE PRESIDENT TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM THE CONGRESS 5 (1958). The presi-
dential use of executive privilege has become more and more widespread in the twentieth
century. President Eisenhower's letter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, directing
both the Secretary and his subordinates to refrain from testifying about executive discus-
sions on the Army-McCarthy dispute, provided substantial precedential authority for the
withholding of information in quasi-judicial proceedings. This trend toward secrecy was
accelerated by the Nixon administration. See R. BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRIVILEoE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYn- 252-64 (1974); F. RouRKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY 65-74
(1961); W. TAFT, TAE PRESmENT AND His POWERS 129 (1916).
3. A fourth question, whether decisions adverse to the President can be enforced,
and how, has also been posed during the debate. The question will not be definitively
answered until circumstances precipitate a constitutional crisis of greater magnitude than
any yet seen.
4. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
5. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
6. Criminal No. 74-110 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 1, 1974).
7. The defendants were John N. Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman,
Charles W. Colson, Robert C. Mardian, Kenneth W. Parkinson, and Gordon Strachan.
All of the defendants were either members of the White House staff or occupied a posi-
tion of responsibility in the 1972 Committee for the Re-Election of the President. 94
S. Ct. at 3097 n.3.
8. The Attorney General delegated the authority to represent the United States
in matters arising out of the investigation of the "Watergate affair" to a Special Prosecu-
tor. 38 Fed. Reg. 30739, as amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 32805 (1973).
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and ordered the prompt production of the subpoenaed items. The
President gave notice of appeal, and subsequently, the Special Prosecu-
tor filed in the Supreme Court a petition for writ of certiorari before
judgmentY Because of the unique setting in which the dispute arose,
the Court granted the petition,'0 bringing before it the important ques-
tions presented by the President's assertion of executive privilege.
After dispensing with several important preliminary questions,"-
Chief Justice Burger examined the two arguments made by the Presi-
dent's counsel in support of a constitutionally based executive privilege.
First, -the President contended that the constitutional doctrine of the
separation of powers guaranteed the absolute independence of -the
Executive in the fulfillment of his Article II duties and that this "in-
dependence . . . insulates a president from judicial subpoena."'"
Secondly, the President argued that the powers expressly delegated to
the Executive by the Constitution carry with them certain inherent
powers and privileges that are necessary to their efficient performance.
Acknowledging the validity of these arguments, Chief Justice Burger
recognized a privilege in favor of the Executive resting on "constitu-
tional underpinnings."'" The Court reasoned that occasions may arise
in which the Executive could obtain candid advice from his advisers
only by insuring them that their comments would not be made public.-4
The privilege granted to the President was necessary, therefore, to in-
sure efficiency in the executive decisionmaking process.
The Court next considered the President's contention that the
privilege was unreviewable. 15 The Chief Justice first examined the
judiciary's role in the tripartite federal government. Admitting -that
each branch must individually interpret ,the Constitution in the pursu-
ance of its constitutional duties, he nonetheless reiterated that "it is
'emphatically the province and the duty' of this Court 'to say what the
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(e) (1970); 94 S. Ct. at 3098-100 & n.1. Because
the district court's order was "final" and therefore appealable and because of the special
circumstances in the case, the Court felt that the petition for writ of certiorari before
judgment was appropriate in Nixon. Id. at 3099.
10. 94 S. Ct. at 3098.
11. The Court considered claims that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that the
dispute was not justiciable and that the Special Prosecutor had failed to comply with
the requirements of FED. R. CGlm. P. 17(c). 94 S. Ct. at 3098-105. The Court's treat-
ment of these issues is noteworthy itself. See note 44 infra.
12. 94 S. Ct. at 3106.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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law is' . . . "16 Therefore, all such constitutional interpretations, re-
gardless of the branch making them, are subject to Supreme Court
review.1 7  This power to determine whether an action by another
branch exceeds its constitutional mandate is based upon the separation
of powers doctrine, which delegates to the Court its role as the ultimate
interpreter of -the Constitution.18 The Chief Justice reasoned that since
such judicial review encompasses the powers expressly delegated by
the Constitution, it must likewise extend "to powers alleged to derive
from enumerated powers."'" Thus, the Court has the authority to re-
view claims of privilege whether based upon the express or the implied
powers of the President.
After concluding that the judiciary is the final arbiter of the
validity of any claim of executive privilege, the Court formulated a test
for determining the merits of such claims. Chief Justice Burger first
discussed the judiciary's constitutional mandate to conduct trials in
accordance with due process, which, he suggested, is in direct conflict
with the exercise of the President's privilege. As seen by the Chief
Justice, the primary responsibility of the courts is to facilitate the
"search for truth." This duty is fulfilled through "full disclosure of all
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence."20  Privileges
to withhold evidence are "not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth."' Because of this
concern, only the most exigent circumstances justify the compromise
of these judicial principles. Therefore, since "the legitimate needs of
the judicial process"" may outweigh the President's privilege in some
situations, the Court adopted a balancing test to weigh these competing
interests.
In order, however, to protect the need for security in the executive
decisionmaking process, 23 the Court felt compelled 'to show deference
to the President in formulating the balancing test. Chief Justice Burger
therefore termed the privilege "presumptive": 24  when the President
asserts the privilege, the party seeking production has the burden of
going forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
16. Id., quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
17. 94 S. Ct. at 3106-07.
18. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. 94 S. Ct. at 3105 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 3108.
21. Id.; see id. at 3108 n.18.
22. Id. at 3107.
23. Sqee text accompanying note 14 supra.
24. 94 S. Ct. at 3107-08.
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Applying this test to the facts in Nixon, the Chief Justice ruled
that the claim of privilege could not prevail. The specific need for
obtaining relevant evidence in a pending criminal proceeding and the
sixth amendment guarantees of fair trial and compulsory process out-
weighed the President's claim of privilege. The Court noted, however,
that the claim of privilege in this case was general-based solely on
the need to insure effective decisionmaking. The Court further noted
that the President's claim made no reference to military or diplomatic
matters. Indeed, the Court intimated that, had these elements been
present, the result may have been different.25  Likewise, the Chief
Justice expressly refused to consider whether a civil litigant's rights
could outweigh even a generalized claim of privilege like that asserted
in Nixon.26
The Court's ruling is the foreseeable result of over 150 years of
litigation involving executive privilege. Arguments presented in favor
of the privilege have been rooted in the common law,27 in the concept
of the separation of powers28 and in -the nature of the executive branch
itself. Regardless of its basis, the privilege has continually been
recognized as a valid exception to the general rules of evidence. 29
In 1807 in United States v. Burr ° Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, sit-
ting as a trial judge, ruled that President Jefferson must deliver con-
fidential correspondences to the court for use by the defendant in a
25. Id. at 3108-09.
26. Id. at 3108-09 n.19.
27. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807);
F. RoURKE, supra note 2, at 63; Berger, The President, Congress and the Courts, 83
YALE L.J 1111 (1974); Annot., 95 L. Ed. 425 (1950); cf. United States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). The common law basis of executive privilege is doubt-
ful. In the year that the Constitution was adopted by the United States, a British court
stated that "it is to be observed, that the crown can no more withhold evidence of docu-
ments in its possession, than a private person. If the court thinks proper to order the
production of any public instrument, that order must be obeyed." The Ship Columbus,
1 Collectanea Juridica 88, 92 (Adm. 1789). Not until fifty-three years later did the
British courts recognize a privilege for "candid exchange" at high levels. Smith v. East
India Co., 41 Eng. Rep. 550 (Ch. 1841). After sweeping extension in Duncan v. Cam-
mell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (making the privilege conclusive), the House of
Lords repudiated the privilege in Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910.
28. See United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). But see Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam), in which the court reasoned that
the recognition of the type of privilege urged in Nixon would amount to a breach of
the separation of powers.
29. E.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (1971) (per curiam); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No.
14,692d) (C.C. D. Va. 1807).
30. 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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pending criminal trial. In the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice
acknowledged, in dictum, an exception in favor of the Executive to the
general rule that "the public . . . has a right to every man's evi-
dence."-" The court did not, however, specifically acknowledge the
basis of the privilege, define its scope, or establish a method for
determining its validity in a given case. It held merely -that there were
situations in which certain documents in the President's possession
should not be opened to the public view. Because Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the privilege resulted from the President's position
of public responsibility, 2 he arguably based the privilege on the
inherent powers of the President.
Subsequent decisions indicated a trend toward executive absolut-
ism, at least in the area of military secrets.33 Such decisions intimated
that the judiciary would be precluded from even considering claims of
executive privilege. These decisions did not determine the scope and
the validity of assertions of executive privilege, holding only that
military and diplomatic secrecy required judicial protection. A line of
cases in the lower federal courts, however, uniformly held that the
power to determine the scope of executive privilege and to determine
the validity of refusals to disclose communications rested solely in the
judiciary as a result of the separation of powers doctrine.3 4
In United States v. Reynolds"5 the Supreme Court agreed with
these lower courts. Passing on a claim of privilege asserted by the gov-
ernment in a suit under the Tort Claims Act, the Court stated that
"[t]he court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege. . . . Judicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive offi-
31. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950); cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
32. 25 F. Cas. at 192.
33. E.g., United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Dayton
v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912). But see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958); Cresmer v. United
States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (which all strongly suggest that even this privi-
lege is not absolute).
34. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S.
1 (1953); United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 4 F.R.D. 108 (W.D.N.Y. 1964);
O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Zimmerman v. Poindexter,
74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Hawaii 1947); Bank Line v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y.
1943).
35. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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cers."3' 0 This ruling has been followed by courts subsequently faced
with claims of privilege . 7
Although these cases seemingly established the supremacy of the
judiciary in deciding such disputes, they did not elucidate a method for
determining the validity of specific claims of executive privilege. A
test later evolved in the lower courts, however, under which the moving
party's need for the documents was balanced against the reasons
asserted by the government in defending their confidentiality.38 This
adjustment of competing interests has been used most notably in cases
involving generalized claims of privilege based solely upon the sanctity
of the executive decisionmaking process." In Nixon v. Sirica 'the
standard was further refined by the recognition of a "presumptive
privilege" in favor of the President, showing deference to the Executive
in striking the balance.41
The balancing test that developed in the lower federal courts was
adopted in its entirety by the Supreme Court in Nixon. This test is
deceptively simple. When the President determines that evidentiary
materials sought by legal process should not be disclosed, he will assert
the privilege. This assertion is presumed to be valid and thus shifts
the burden of going forward to the party seeking produotion. The
moving party must then rebut the presumption. Once this has
occurred, the relative merits of both parties are weighed and the court
decides whether production is warranted.
The strengths of this test are readily apparent. Primarily, the
36. Id. at 8-10.
37. Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1964);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshal, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overby v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 163 (5th Cir. 1955); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See also Rosee v. Board of
Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. IM. 1965).
38. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.LD. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), afI'd per
curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
39. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiarn); Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
952 (1967).
40. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In this case the court was pre-
sented with arguments similar to those in United States v. Nixon. Here, the President
sought to withhold tape recordings from the grand jury, rather than from the prosecution
or defense.
41. Id. at 717.
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flexibility inherent in balancing tests is well suited for insuring the max-
imum sanctity of conflicting interests-here, the independence of
both the executive and judicial branches, as well as the basic principles
underlying each.42 These interests are weighed on a case by case
basis. Obviously, this approach is more desirable than the wholesale
compromise of principles which would result from the recognition of
an absolute privilege on the one hand or the denial of a privilege as
a matter of law on the other.43 An additional strength of the Nixon
test is the presumption of validity afforded the President's assertion.
This presumption conforms the test to the separation of powers doctrine
by showing deference to the executive branch.
These strengths, however, may, in future applications, be out-
weighed by weaknesses in the test. The burden placed upon the party
seeking evidence is somewhat inequitable. It requires that party to
justify access to facts essential to his case, contrary to the accepted
methods of the Anglo-American legal system. 44 Furthermore, the
prestige of the parties involved and the questions pertaining to national
security that may arise in cases like Nixon may make it difficult for
lower federal and state court judges to render competent decisions.
Foremost among these weaknesses are problems in the mechanics
of the balancing test. Before a court is called upon to apply the Nixon
test, the party seeking production must comply with the pertinent
evidentiary requirements for obtaining a subpoena, such as showing
relevance and materiality. If the privilege is then asserted to prevent
disclosure, what further can be shown to overcome the President's pre-
sumption? Cases applying the standards of Rule 17(c),4" the rule
42. See text accompanying notes 12-15, 21-24 supra.
43. For the same reasons, a test similar to the one adopted in Nixon could be uti-
lized to evaluate "novel" privileges. For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), the Supreme Court seems to have applied a balancing test of sorts in weighing
the merits of the "journalist's privilege" to withhold the identity of his sources. In that
case, the Court held, again, that the demands of the criminal justice system compelled
disclosure. However, the first amendment guarantee of free press is also a fundamen-
tal right, and deserves, at least, the protection of a case by case weighing, if not a pre-
sumptive privilege in favor of the reporter, rather than a summary denial of judicial pro-
tection.
44. See cases cited note 31 supra.
45. The leading case interpreting these standards is Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), which recognized that the subpoena duces tecum was not
intended to provide a method for discovery in criminal cases, but was merely a means
to expedite trials by establishing a time and place prior to trial for the inspection of
materials obtained through compliance with the standards of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 220. These standards were concisely stated by Judge Win-
field in United States v. lozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In order to pro-
cure pretrial production, the moving party must show that the documents are both evi-
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applicable in Nixon, indicate that this initial showing practically ex-
hausts the knowledge of the party seeking production. Indeed, not
much more than a general showing of relevance, admissibility and
specificity is possible in cases in which the documents sought are of a
secret nature.
One must assume, however, that something more is required to
rebut ,the presumption afforded the President than a reiteration of the
facts justifying the issuance of a subpoena. To conclude otherwise
would render the presumption meaningless-a mere form, serving no
purpose other than to frustrate the party seeking production and to pro-
long the court's inquiry. Apparently, the litigant must assert the basic
principles underlying his action itself as a part of this further showing.46
These rudimentary principles include, for example, any constitutional
rights of the litigants as well as any strong public policy reflected in
his suit. In addition, any facts that make the moving party's need criti-
cal to the maintenance of his action or that distinguish his case from
others of a similar nature should be asserted.47
In those cases in which -the underlying principles and special facts
presented are adjudged to rebut the presumption, something further
must be shown by the Executive to justify nondisclosure. Is the Pres-
ident now required to disclose the specific interests and conversations
that should be guarded?48  It may seem initially that disclosure of such
information to the courts would deprive the balancing test of its sub-
stance, since the same result could be reached through initial in camera
inspection without the delay occasioned by the Nixon -test. The process
dentiary and relevant, that they are not accessible by other means available to the party
seeking them, and that the materials are essential to the preparation of the case to be
presented. In addition, the application for the subpoena must be made in good faith
and not merely as a "fishing expedition."
46. In Nixon the principles underlying all criminal proceedings-the constitutional
rights of defendants to a fair trial and compulsory process, the need for efficiency and
justice in the system of criminal law, and the nation's committment to the rule of law-
when coupled with the special facts presented, note 47 infra, were adjudged to outweigh
the presumption. 94 S. Ct. 3106-08.
47. In Nixon these circumstances included the fact that the alleged injustices were
perpetrated in the offices of the White House. Moreover, the President had been de-
clared an unindicted co-conspirator by the grand jury investigating the Watergate scan-
dal. Brief for the Petitioner at 11-12.
48. This problem could also lead to litigation because the assertion of the general
privilege afforded in Nixon may constitute a waiver of other privileges recognized by
the courts, i.e. those resting on the need to protect military and diplomatic secrets. It
is suggested that this should be the case, since the assertion of the general privilege in
the face of such secrets would be little more than a frustration of the legal process and
a stalling tactic, if in fact privileges do exist for the specific purpose of protecting the
la~tional security.
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outlined in Nixon, however, affords the maximum protection for execu-
tive conversations by precluding disclosure, even to the courts, except
in those special cases in which the need for the documents outweighs
the presumption.
Furthermore, it has been argued that even in camera inspection
of the conversations would negate the beneficial results of the privi-
lege.49 There is, however, "no danger to the public interest in sub-
mit5.ng the question of privilege to -the decision of the courts. The
judges. . . are public officers whose responsibility under the Constitu-
tion is just as great as that of the heads of the executive departments." 0
When the presumption of judicial integrity is also considered, there is
sufficient protection afforded the executive in those comparatively few
cases in which the court is called upon to balance the important com-
peting interests presented.
Having reached the point in the test at which the needs of the
executive are to be weighed against the countervailing public and pri-
vate rights presented by the party seeking production, the court is faced
with a serious dilemma. Confronted with an array of conflicting princi-
ples and factual arguments, the courts will undoubtedly examine prior
cases to determine which faots have been crucial in decisions concern-
ing the exercise of executive privilege. These cases indicate that the
following facts carry considerable weight: whether the materials sought
are of primary importance to the case presented;5 the volume and
diversity of prior production by the party asserting the privilege;52 the
presence of available alternatives for obtaining the information
sought;53 allegations of governmental misconduct;54 and allegations of
49. The argument that the disclosure of executive deliberations to even one person
outside the executive branch would inhibit the flow of ideas necessary to effective deci-
sionmaking by instilling a fear of prosecution or public criticism in advisers has been
accepted by federal courts in previous cases. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See gen-
erally R. BERGER, supra note 2; F. RouRKE, supra note 2.
50. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S.
1 (1953). Judge Maris's views were adopted by the dissenters, Justices Black, Frank-
furter and Jackson, in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
51. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966),
af'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
54. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964); Bank
of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Rosee v. Board of Trade,
36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
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perversion of government power.55 While such factors may be helpful
in reaching a decision, the court's ultimate determination can be made
only after considering -the case in the perspective of the political system
in which the judiciary functions.
The separation of powers doctrine, viewed in the realistic manner
presented in Nixon, must be the focal point of this consideration.56 In
weighing the public and private interests involved in such cases, it is
apparent that not all court-protected interests warrant an intrusion into
executive privacy. Of primary concern, however, is the judiciary's role
as a limiting factor in the tripartite system, as well as its dedication to
its function as a forum for the resolution of conflicts. The courts must,
therefore, conscientiously protect the mechanism for accomplishing
these purposes. Thus, those rights that are critical to this process
should outweigh the privilege in all cases except those presenting
countervailing interests most critical to the preservation of the govern-
mental system as a whole.
There is another important area which should be considered by
courts applying the Nixon test. The Supreme Court in Nixon assumed
that secrecy is both necessary and appropriate in the decisionmaking
process. 57  Secrecy is, however, by its very nature foreign -to and
potentially destructive of a democracy and its practical institutions. For
that reason, its use should be minimized, 'the indulgence in this practice
being permitted only in situations in which it is absolutely essential. A
consideration of this problem and an awareness of the trends toward
increasing use of secrecy and its validation by the Supreme Court
should be paramount in the deliberations of those applying the Nixon
test.
Nixon establishes an additional weapon in the executive arsenal
of secrecy. While the privilege recognized by the Court is not absolute,
it is one which places a substantial burden upon the party seeking evi-
dentiary materials in a criminal proceeding. Regardless of its availa-
55. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960).
56. In contrast to the President's interpretation of the doctrine as a source of al-
most absolute independence among the branches, Chief Justice Burger viewed it as a lim-
iting factor. He stated that the "separate powers were not intended to operate with ab-
solute independence," but that each branch must depend upon the others for validation
and implementation of its actions. 94 S. Ct. at 3107. For example, the Congress relies
upon the Executive to carry out congressional declarations of war, a power expressly
delegated to the former. Likewise, the Executive relies upon funding from Congress for
the projects that the former deems important, and for confirmation of official appoint-
ments. The judiciary is instrumental in enforcing the acts of Congress and the decrees
of the Executive.
57. Id. at 3106.
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bility and validity in non-criminal proceedings or the extension of the
Court's reasoning into other areas of privilege, the implications of the
ruling are important when viewed in the context of the growth of execu-
tive power in the American system. In addition, serious weaknesses
in the Nixon test pose difficult problems for those who will apply it in
future cases. What is called for in response to the decision is extreme
presidential circumspection in asserting the privilege, as well as con-
tinued, responsible review by the courts. Hopefully, such judicious
exercise of power will prevent executive privacy from degenerating into
a convenient instrument for concealing from the public what it has a
right to know.
H. KING MCGLAUGHON, JR.
Constitutional Law-Lowering the Compelling State Interest
Hurdle
During the twelve years since its decision in Baker v. Carr,' the
Supreme Court has considered numerous challenges to state election
laws raised by potential voters and candidates. 2 In ruling upon these
challenges, the Court has developed an exacting standard to be applied
in determining whether a state's restrictions on the right to vote violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Because
of the stringency of this standard, which requires a state to justify its
restrictions by showing their necessity to further a "compelling" state
interest,4 many state laws regulating voter qualifications and candidacy
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In this landmark, legislative apportionment case, the
Court extended equal protection to nonracial challenges of state election statutes. Note,
Oregon v. Mitchell and the Compelling State Interest Doctrine-The End of an Era?,
22 SYRwcusn L. Rav. 1123, 1125 (1971). In so extending the equal protection clause,
the Court "substantially modified the constitutional matrix in this area." 30 O-o ST.
L.J 202 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419
(1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
3. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), in which
the Court justified its imposition of this new test as follows: "This careful examination
is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our
representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may partici-
pate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government." Id, at 626,
4. Id. at 627,
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requirements have been declared unconstitutional.5 In the recent case
of Storer v. Brown,6 however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a portion of the California Eleotion Code7 concerning inde-
pendent candidates.8  In upholding these statutes, the Court ostensibly
applied the compelling state interest test;9 however, an examination of
the majority opinion reveals that the Court aotually applied a standard
much closer to that of the traditional equal protection test that is
normally reserved for cases in which neither fundamental rights nor
suspect classifications are involved.' 0 When viewed in light of other
recent franchise opinions," the Storer decision indicates the Court's
willingness to give state legislatures greater latitude in enacting elec-
toral restrictions and to ease the states' burdens in meeting challenges
to these laws.
The Storer case arose out of the 1972 California elections in which
plaintiffs Storer, Frommhagen, Hall, and Tyner sought to be placed on
the ballot as independent candidates in 'the general election. Storer
and Frommhagen, who both desired to run for Congress from their
respective districts, were denied ballot access because they had been
affiliated with the Democratic Party within a year prior to the 1972
primary,'2 thereby failing to meet one of the requirements for indepen-
dent candidacy prescribed by California law.' 3 Plaintiffs Hall and
5. See, e.g., cases cited note 2 supra.
6. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Id. at 755.
7. CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 6830-31, 6833 (West Supp. 1974).
8. 415 U.S. at 736.
9. Id.: see American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974).
10. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) Chief Justice Warren ex-
plained the traditional equal protection test as follows:
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enact-
ing laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it.
Id. at 425-26. For a discussion of the development of the two equal protection standards
and the distinctions between them see Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age
Statute, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 1, 28-32 (1970).
11. E.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 535 (1974) (Blackmun & Rehnquist,
J.J., dissenting); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), aff'g
inem. 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
12. 415 U.S. at 728.
1 3. CAr. Et. COqDE 6830 (West Supp. 1974), which governs independent ca-
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Tyner, who desired to run for President and Vice-President of the
United States,' 4 complied with the above party disaffiliation require-
ment, but were denied ballot access because of their failure to meet
the requirements concerning the submission of nominating petitions."1
Thus the four potential candidates brought actions in federal district
court challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of the California
Election Code regulating independent candidates' access to the ballot.'6
A three-judge district court dismissed the complaints, concluding
that the statutes "served a sufficiently important state interest to sustain
their constitutionality."'1 7 On direct appeal, 18 a divided Supreme Court
upheld the provisions requiring one year of disaffiliation.' 9 In doing
so, the Court concluded that the requirement furthered "the State's
interest in the stability of its political system"-an interest the Court
found to be compelling. This note will examine the manner in which
the Court evaluated the disaffiliation requirement and the nature and
extent of its departure from the previously developed compelling state
interest test.
Before evaluating the Court's opinion, it is necessary to examine
didates, provides in part:
Each candidate or group of candidates shall file a nomination paper which
shall contain:
(c) A statement that the candidate and each signer of his nomination pa-
per did not vote at the immediately preceding primary election at which a can-
didate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper ...
(d) A statement that the candidate is not, and was not at any time during
the one year preceding the immediately preceding primary election at which
a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper,
registered as affiliated with a political party ....
14. Hall and Tyner were members of the Communist Party, which had failed to
qualify for ballot status under California law. They therefore sought to run as inde-
pendent candidates. 415 U.S. at 728.
15. The Court summarized these requirements as follows:
The independent candidate must . . . file nomination papers signed by no less
than 5% nor more than 6% of the entire vote cast in the preceding general
election in the area for which the candidate seeks to run. § 6831. All of these
signatures must be obtained during a 24-day period following the primary and
ending 60 days prior to the general election, § 6833, and none of the signatures
may be gathered from persons who vote at the primary election. § 6830(c).
Id. at 726-27.
16. Id. They argued that the statutes violated their first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights.
17. Id. at 728.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) authorizes an appeal directly to the Supreme Court
from a judgment of a three-judge district court concerning the constitutionality of a state
law. ;
19. The Court remanded the cases of Hall and Tyner, instructing the district court
to determine from prior election data that was unavailable to the Court whether the pe-
tition requirements placed an unconstitutional burden on independents seeking positions
on the ballot. 415 U.S. at 738-40.
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briefly the franchise cases out of which the compelling state interest
test evolved.20  Its development may be viewed in three phases."' In
the cases constituting the initial phase,22 the Court articulated the im-
portance of the right to vote23 and asserted that a state's abridgment
of this right should be examined very carefully.24  By the time of its
decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,25 a majority of the
Court was on the verge of expressing a new equal protection standard
to be applied in voting rights cases.
The articulation of this new test occurred during the second phase.
In Williams v. Rhodes26 the Court made clear that, although a state had
the authority to enact laws regulating elections, this grant of authority
was not absolute; it could not be exercised in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause.2 7  The Court then listed the following factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether an election statute is unconstitutional:
20. Prior to the mid-1960's, the Court had applied the concepts of the equal protec-
tion clause to two types of cases: those involving commercial regulations, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960), and those in which racially discrim-
inatory state action was alleged, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
The Court applied two different equal protection standards in evaluating statutes, its
choice depending upon the type of classification involved. In commercial regulation
cases, the Court determined whether the statute rationally promoted a legitimate state
interest. The state's interest was presumed to be legitimate unless the classifications
were shown to be arbitrary. Note, 22 Sm.cusE L. Rav., supra note 1. Because this
traditional standard allowed important individual rights to be subordinated to less impor-
tant state interests, the Court applied a more stringent standard when racial classifica-
tions were involved. Because of their "suspect" classifications, these statutes were pre-
sumed illegitimate unless "shown to be absolutely free of any purpose which might en-
courage 'invidious discrimination."' Id. at 1125.
21. This somewhat arbitrary division is devised merely to aid in the analysis of
a large group of decisions. Admittedly it oversimplifies the process of the development
of the compelling state interest test.
22. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia's poll tax
held unconstitutional); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (Texas law prohibiting
servicemen from voting held unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(Alabama state legislative apportionment plans held unconstitutional).
23. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court stated that "[tihe right
to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society,
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." Id.
at 555. "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society." Id. at 561-62.
24. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Court said,
"We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted
under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id. at 670.
25. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
26. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). This case involved a challenge by would-be candidates
to the Ohio election laws, which, because of their stringent requirements, made it vir-
tually impossible for a third party or an independent candidate to gain access to the
ballot. Id. at 25.
27. Id. at 29.
434 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
"the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the
State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification. ' 28  Since the "precious" rights of
voting and association were involved, the Court held that the State had
to justify its infringement of them by showing a "compelling state
interest.' '29
Because the majority in Williams rested its opinion on both first
amendment and equal protection grounds, it remained unclear whether
the Court had created a new equal protection test to be applied in fran-
chise cases. 30  Subsequent decisions removed any uncertainty. Al-
though Shapiro v. Thompson"' was not a voting rights case, the Court
stated succinctly the appropriate equal protection standard for evalu-
ating statutes abridging rights that the Court deemed to be "fundamen-
tal": "[The traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the
classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate move-
ment, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of
whether it promotes a compelling state interest."8' 2
After the compelling state interest test had been used to declare
several state election laws unconstitutional,33 the development of the
test entered its third phase14 when certain members of the Court began
to express their displeasure at the continued interference with enact-
ments of state legislatures. 35  An early example of this abandonment
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 31.
30. 30 Omo ST. L.J, supra note 1, at 215.
31. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). This case arose out of challenges to states' durational
residency requirements for welfare benefits.
32. Id. at 638. Having developed this new standard, the Court then began to ap-
ply it in cases in which state election laws were challenged. In Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969), for example, the Court expressed the
compelling state interest test in a two-step analysis. It must first be determined whether
the classifications under consideration are "tailored so that the exclusion of appellant
and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal." If they
are so tailored, then the Court must determine whether that goal constitutes a compel-
ling state interest. Id. at 632 n.14.
33. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (Tennessee durational residency
requirements for voting held unconstitutional); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)
(Texas filing fee system held unconstitutional). Other cases in which the Court applied
this standard in evaluating election laws include, City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970) (Arizona law permitting only real property taxpayers to vote on issu-
ance of general obligation bonds held unconstitutional); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419 (1970) (Maryland law denying franchise to residents of federal enclaves within the
state held unconstitutional); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)
(Louisiana law restricting franchise in certain elections to those who paid taxes on real
property held unconstitutional).
34. This phase overlaps the previous one.
. See, e.g., Dunn v, Blvmstein, 495 W.$. 330, 363 (1972) (Burger, C.J, disspnt-
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of the stringent standard was the Court's affirmance, by a five to four
vote, of the district court decision in Lippitt v. Cipollone.3" The
majority accepted without opinion the standard applied below, which
clearly was less demanding than the compelling state interest test.37
More recently in Rosario v. Rockefeller" -the majority applied a
standard that, according to the dissent, resembled "the traditional
'rational basis' test."' 9  Both of these cases were relied on by the
majority in its decision in Storer,40 which should also be included in
this third phase.
In analyzing -the Storer decision, it first must be determined
whether, under the facts of the case, the application of the compelling
state interest test was required. Although the Court has never classi-
ing), in which the Chief Justice termed the compelling state interest test "seemingly in-
surmountable." Id. at 363-64. In the very recent case of O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S.
524, 535 (1974) (Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting), Justice Blackmun expressed
his dissatisfaction as follows: "I would refrain from continued tampering and interfer-
ence with the details of state election laws. If details are deserving of cure, the State's
legislature, not this Court, ought to be the curative agent." Id. at 537.
36. 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), affg mem. 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971). This
case upheld Ohio's statute which specified that candidates in party primaries could not
have voted in another party's primary within the four previous years.
A similar retreat by the Court from its application of the compelling state interest
test occurred in equal protection challenges in other areas. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (California Water Code
provision restricting voting rights in water district general elections to landowners and
apportioning votes according to land value upheld); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (Oregon judicial procedure for evicting non-paying tenants upheld); Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (West Virginia requirement of sixty percent voter approval
for incurring public debts or increasing tax rates upheld); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (Maryland law setting maximum for welfare grants upheld).
It has been suggested, and the Court's approaches in the above cases and in Storer
add credence to the suggestion, that in recent years the Court has moved away from
a rigid dual-pronged equal protection approach. Rather than choosing either the tradi-
tional, rational basis test or the stringent, compelling state interest test, the Court has
begun to employ a standard lying somewhere between the two extremes. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
37. The district court stated that the state legislature is presumed to have acted
constitutionally; Lippitt v. Cipollone, 337 F. Supp. 1405, 1406 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd
mem., 404 U.S. 1032 (1972); a presumption that is rejected under the compelling state
interest test. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
38. 410 U.S. 752 (1973). The Court upheld a provision of the New York Elec-
tion Code that restricted primary voting to those whose party affiliation had been regis-
tered at least thirty days before the previous general election (i.e. eleven months prior
to the non-presidential primary).
39. Id. at 767 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority's opinion seems to support
this conclusion because the Court affirmed the statute upon finding that the restriction
was "tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or arbi-
trary." Id. at 762. The "invidious" or "arbitrary" test is traditionally applied in cases
involving economic regulation. See note 20 supra.
40. 415 U.S. at 734, 736.
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fled candidacy per se as a fundamental right,41 it has recognized that
the rights of candidates and those of voters often overlap.42 Thus an
infringement of candidates' rights that also affects those of voters
requires the application of the compelling state interest test .4  The
majority's nominal use of the compelling state interest test in Storer '
suggests that there was sufficient infringement of voters' rights here to
require a close scrutiny. As the Court itself stated in Lubin v. Panish,'
decided the same day as Storer, "Mhe right to vote is 'heavily
burdened' if that vote may be cast only for one of -two candidates in
a primary election at a time when other candidates are clamoring for
a place on the ballot. '46  Similarly, the rights of a significant group of
voters are "heavily burdened" when the number of independent can-
didates is limited.
Although the Court recognized the necessity of applying the com-
pelling state interest test in Storer, it departed from its own guidelines
established in earlier cases in applying that test. One of the funda-
mental aspects of the test is the state's burden of justifying any restric-
tions on the right to vote.4 7  In the past the Court had clearly rejected
the automatic presumption of legitimacy of the state action 48  and
instead had required the state to show compelling reasons for its restric-
tions.49
Despite this basic requirement, there is no indication in the Storer
opinion that the burden of justification was placed on California. On
the contrary, the Court stated that it had no reason for "concluding that
the device California chose, § 6830(d), was not an essential part of its
41. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972). But cf. Lippitt v.
Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), affg mem. 337 F. Supp.
1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
42. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
43. Id. at 144.
44. An example of the Court's use of this terminology is the following statement:
"We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweigh-
ing the interest [of] the candidate and his supporters. . . ." 415 U.S. at 736,
45. 415 U.S. 709 (1974). The Court held unconstitutional the California filing
fee requirement, which in its application prevented indigent candidates from gaining bal-
lot status. In reaching its decision, the Court found that the "[s]election of candidates
solely on the basis of ability to pay a fixed fee without providing any alternative means
[was] not reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate election
interests." Id. at 717 (emphasis added). Because of the State's complete failure to
demonstrate the necessity of its restrictions, the Court in Lubin was able to find the
statute unconstitutional under even the more tolerant standard that it applied.
46. Id. at 716.
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
48. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
49. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
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overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals." 50  Rather than
requiring the State to prove that the restriction was "necessary to
achieve its articulated state goal," 51 it accepted a lack of proof to the
contrary as sufficient. Clearly in doing so, the Court eased consider-
ably the State's task in justifying its statute.
Implicit in the Court's acceptance of the disaffiliation requirement
is its assumption that an absence of the requirement would lead to
political instability. However, the opinion referred to no data support-
ing such conclusion; thus it must be assumed that the Court was merely
speculating on the result. Under the traditional equal protection test,
such an approach by the Court is permissible.52  But under previously
enumerated guidelines, the compelling state interest ,test prohibits such
speculation; mere theoretical problems do not justify infringements of
individual rights.
53
The Court's discussion of the rationale behind the disaffiliation
requirement displays other ways in which it departed from past guide-
lines.54 In prior decisions the Court had required "exacting stand-
ard[s] of precision" in statutes affecting voting rights.55  Those
statutes, which contained sweeping exclusions of a large number of citi-
zens for reasons that were valid for only a segment of that group,
were declared unconstitutional.56 Here, however, the Court said that
one of the justifications of the disaffiliation requirement was that it pro-
tected against "candidacies prompted by short-range political goals,
pique or personal quarrel. 57 The Court failed to consider that in ex-
cluding those types of candidacies, the statute also excludes those
prompted by a desire for public service and a belief that the partisan
candidates fail to represent adequately the viewpoints of a significant
group of voters.
50. 415 U.S. at 73 (emphasis added).
51. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
52. Under this less stringent standard, "the Court may even engage in speculation
to find some possible justification for the state law." Engdahl, supra note 10, at 32.
53. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968).
54. The Court stated the reasons for the disaffiliation requirement as follows:
It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent can-
didates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternate
course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by
short-range political goals, pique or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial
barrier to a party fielding an "independent" candidate to capture and bleed off
votes in the general election that might well go to another party.
415 U.S. at 735.
55. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
56. See, e.g., id. at 351; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
57. 415 U.S. at 735.
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As the Court stated in Storer and had earlier stated in Williams
v. Rhodes,5 8 among the factors to be considered in evaluating a statute
under the compelling state interest test are "the facts and circumstances
behind the law." 9 In prior decisions the Court had included practical
political considerations among the circumstances that it considered.
Thus in Williams it noted that Ohio's early petition deadline was at odds
with the constantly changing nature of American politics.Y0 In Storer,
however, the Court completely disregarded the disaffiliation require-
ment's relationship to political realities."' By omitting this considera-
tion the Court failed to evaluate fully the extent of the impact of the
requirement upon potential independent candidates.
The final and perhaps most striking departure of the Court from
its past decisions was its failure to consider the availability of less
burdensome means of achieving the State's objectives. Under the tra-
ditional equal protection test, a legislature has great latitude in enacting
regulations, as long as they are rationally related to the state's objec-
tives.6" But under the compelling state interest test, there are further
limitations on the legislature's authority. As the Court stated in Dunn
v. Blumstein, 3 even if a state is attempting to achieve a legitimate in-
terest, it cannot "unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally pro-
tected activity."64  The Court stated further: "[I]f there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitu-
tionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater
interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means.' "05 In
contrast, while Storer stated that California was not required to choose
ineffectual means to further its interests, 6 it failed -to require California
to show that there were no effective, but less burdensome, means avail-
able. This failure is especially significant in light of the Court's state-
ment that "[a] State need not take the course California has.167  Hav-
58. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
59. 415 U.S. at 730, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
60. See 393 U.S. at 33. The Court explained that the identity of those opposed
to the candidates and policies of the major parties often could not be determined until
shortly before the election.
61. As the dissent noted, this requirement meant that a party member would have
to realize seventeen months before an election that he desired to run as an independent
candidate. Accordingly, he would have to take action at a time when the potential
nominees of the two major parties would probably be unknown. 415 U.S. at 758.
62. Engdahl, supra note 10, at 29.
63. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
64. Id. at 343.
65. Id.
66. 415 U.S. at 736.
67. Id. North Carolina, for example, is not noted for its political instability or
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ing implied that some states achieved political stability by other means,
the Court should have inquired into the nature of these alternatives.
By not requiring the State to utilize less drastic means, the Court went
a step further in increasing the latitude of the legislature's authority.
The significance of the Storer decision lies in its implications for
future franchise cases. It suggests that, when election laws that do not
directly and blatantly infringe the rights of voters are challenged, the
Court will lower the justification hurdle that the state must surmount.
As a result, it is likely that the Court will approve electoral restrictions
that accomplish indirectly what it was previously declared could not be
done directly. The Storer decision indicates particularly that when
candidacy restrictions are involved, the Court will apply a more lenient
standard of evaluation. Such an approach by the Court seems unwise,
for little has been gained if a soldier in Texas 6s or an indigent in Vir-
ginia69 is allowed into the voting booth only to discover that those candi-
dates representing his point of view have been excluded from the bal-
lot. James Madison recognized this critical relationship between rights
of candidates and those of voters when he said, "A republic may be
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy, as well by limiting the num-
ber capable of being elected as the number authorized to elect."' "°
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON
Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section
1983 Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities
In developing satisfactory judicial approaches to the section 1983
remedies of the Civil Rights Act,1 federal courts have encountered con-
its high degree of interparty raiding, and yet it places no requirement of prior disaffilia-
tion on independent candidates. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122 (Supp. 1973), a
potential independent candidate must file an affidavit stating that he "does not affiliate
with any political party" (emphasis added). There is no further requirement that he
must not have affiliated with a party at any time in the past.
68. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
69. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
70. 5 J. ELLIoT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FFDEPAL CONSTITUTION 404 (1845).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
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flicting policy considerations. Effective redress for injured parties
against officials "acting under color of" state law has been curtailed by
various governmental immunities designed to protect officials and to
promote efficient, decisive government action.2 Federal courts have
also guarded against overburdening the federal judicial structure and
against unnecessarily preempting traditional state torts.3 These con-
siderations have prompted three significant judicial limitations on sec-
tion 1983 actions:4 (1) a narrow interpretation of the word "person"
in the act;5 (2) a strict construction of the eleventh amendment's
sovereign immunity implications, which has severely limited suits
against the state; 6 and (3) the development of various personal immun-
ities.
Although section 1983 actions against governments have thus
been restricted, the United States Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes7
unanimously8 reaffirmed the section's vitality in damage actions against
individuals who have allegedly abused governmental executive powers.
In suits brought on behalf of three students killed in 1970 at Kent State
University, the Court held that neither the eleventh amendment nor an
absolute executive immunity sheltered state officials with discretionary9
responsibilities from personal liability for unconstitutional actions.
Although some major issues remain unsettled," Scheuer signals prog-
ress in reconciling section 1983 damage remedies with the policies of
governmental immunity.
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
3. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
4. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1974).
5. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Municipal Immunity under the Civil Rights
Act--Closing the Loopholes, 52 N.C.L. Rav. 1289 (1974).
6. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44
U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (1972) traces the interpretative expansion of the eleventh
amendment from its primary purpose, that of protecting states from the debt claims of
citizens of other states, into a broad doctrine of sovereign immunity.
7. 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
8. The decision was 8-0, with Mr. Justice Douglas not participating.
9. Courts have traditionally attempted to distinguish between "ministerial" (or
"non-discretionary") duties and "quasi-judicial" (discretionary) duties. An early case
defined a ministerial duty as one in respect "to which nothing is left to discretion. It
is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and im-
posed by law." Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1866). On the
other hand, a discretionary duty is one in which an official has "a power and duty to
make a choice among valid alternatives." Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Of-
ficers: Damage Actions, 77 HIv. L. REv. 209, 218 (1963).
10. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
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The tragedy in question occurred on May 4, 1970, when Ohio
National Guardsmen fired into a group of students at Kent State
University, killing four and injuring nine. Section 1983 actions were
filed on behalf of three deceased students,1 joining as defendants in
their individual capacities Ohio Governor Rhodes, 2 the guard adjutant
and assistant adjutant generals, various other guard personnel and the
Kent State University president. Allegedly, the defendants willfully
caused an unnecessary guard deployment and ordered illegal actions
resulting in the student deaths.' 8
Before answers were filed,' 4 the district court dismissed the
actions'; because they were against the state and therefore barred by
the eleventh amendment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed,' 6 finding alternatively that an unqualified executive immunity
protected the defendants. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
dismissals as "inappropriate" and held that the claimants were "entitled
to offer evidence to support [their] claims."'17
In considering the lower courts' sovereign immunity arguments,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed earlier decisions that the eleventh
amendment precluded claims against the state as the named defendant
or the defendant in fact."8 Relying on Ex parte Young,'9 the Court
11. A special counsel to the attorney general of Ohio stated that twenty-two civil
suits had been commenced claiming more than ninety-nine million dollars in damages.
Howarth, Sovereign Immunity-An Argument Pro, 22 CLEV. ST. L. Rlv. 48 (1973).
Many suits encountered difficulties. One was dismissed on the ground that the state
could not be sued in tort. Krause v. Rhodes, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E.2d 321
(1971), rev'd, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1052 (1973). In another, the Court held that a suit for injunctive relief against prema-
ture deployment of the guard by government officials and for a declaration that a state
statute was unconstitutional was not justiciable under the circumstances. Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. Governor Rhodes was sued for initially calling out the guard and for allegedly
inciting unconstitutional activity later. Brief for Petitioners at 11-12, 59-60, Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
13. 94 S. Ct. at 1686.
14. Two proclamations by the governor were attached to the motion to dismiss,
one ordering the guard to protect against truck strike violence and the other recounting
conditions on the Kent State campus. Id.
15. Krause v. Rhodes, Civil No. C 70-544 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 1971); Miller v.
Rhodes, Civil No. C 70-816 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 1971); Scheuer v. Rhodes, Civil No.
C 70-859 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 1971).
16. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972) (2-1 decision).
17. 94 S. Ct. at 1686.
18. Id. at 1687, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This case, which permitted suit for injunctive relief
against the attorney general of Minnesota to prohibit enforcement of an allegedly un-
constitutional statute, attempted to reconcile the eleventh amendment prohibition of
suits against the state with the fourteenth amendment prohibition of constitutional in-
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nevertheless concluded that "the Eleventh Amendment provides no
shield for a state official" confronted by a section 1983 claim. The
Court reasoned that
when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of
the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct. ' 20
Although both Young and Scheuer concerned state officers with con-
siderable discretionary powers, the two cases arguably can be distin-
guished because Young was a federal action seeking an injunction
rather than monetary damages. Nevertheless, Scheuer concluded that,
as long as recovery is not sought from public funds, executive officials
whose discretionary conduct2' violates section 1983 rights can be sued
for damages in their individual capacities.22
In similarly rejecting the court of appeal's theory of executive im-
munity,2 3 the Supreme Court indicated that immunities were judicial
value judgments. Executive immunity, for example, represented "'an
impression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of
government.' ",24 Unlike absolute legislative 2 and judicial20 immuni-
ties, however, unqualified executive immunities are not firmly en-
fringements occurring "under color of" state law. This case was the precedent for ac-
tions against school boards in the important desegregation cases of the 1950's.
20. 94 S. Ct. at 1687, quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
21. The three cases cited to support the Court's conclusion involved public officials
with relatively little discretionary power. In Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915),
an election official violated section 1983 by enforcing a "grandfather clause" in Mary-
land that effectively denied a black the right to vote. Damage actions in voting cases
have been previously justified by the special nature of the constitutional deprivation.
See McCormack, supra note 4, at 60-64. The other two cases, Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), concerned
alleged brutality by law enforcement officials.
22. Although courts might recognize an absolute sovereign immunity for states
under the eleventh amendment depriving federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction,
there is no jurisdictional bar to section 1983 actions against state executive officials in
their individual capacities. The qualified immunity enjoyed by executive officials is an
affirmative defense or privilege, more accurately relating to the claim's merits than to
a court's jurisdiction. See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 41.
23. "It can hardly be argued at this late date that under no circumstances can the
officers of state government be subject to liability under [section 1983]." Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (1974).
24. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959), quoted in Scheuer v. Rhodes,
94 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (1974). Barr involved a libel action rather than a section 1983
infringement.
25. 94 S. Ct. at 1690, citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
26. 94 S. Ct. at 1690, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
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trenched in law and judicial history. 7  Since Congress did not intend
for section 1983 to abolish all common law immunities2s or to be com-
pletely circumscribed by absolute immunities,29 the Court initiated a
search for a middle ground. Citing previous immunity justifications
such as possible injustice to officials who are required to make
discretionary decisions and harm to efficient, effective government, °
the Court noted that the concept of immunity presupposes that "it is
better [for an official] to risk some error and possible injury from such
error than not to decide or act at all." 1
Despite such considerations, the Court concluded that judicial
review of discretionary executive conduct allegedly violating constitu-
tional rights was imperative. Otherwise, for example, a governor's
determination of the "fact" of an insurrection to justify his actions would
make "the fiat of a state governor, and not the Constitution of the
United States"32 the supreme law of the land. To prevent section 1983
from being "drained of meaning,"33 the Court iroposed a qualified im-
munity for executive-branch personnel. The immunity would be
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared ...
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith
27. 94 S. Ct. at 1691. The Court noted that unlike executive actions, judicial er-
rors may be reviewed and corrected on appeal. Id. at 1690. Judge Celebrezze examined
the status of executive immunities in greater detail in Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430,
454 (6th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
28. 94 S. Ct. at 1690.
29. Id. at 1692.
30. Id. at 1688.
31. Id. at 1689. In Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge
Learned Hand held that the United States Attorney General and other federal officials
enjoyed absolute immunities when sued by the plaintiff allegedly for falsely arresting
him as an enemy alien. Hand reasoned that it was "better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation." Id. Although Scheuer appears to have approved Hand's
logic, the Gregoire result has probably been overruled, at least concerning section 1983
actions, by Scheuer and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1972), on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because Bivens held that federal officials
were subject to suit under section 1983, one commentator suggested, even before Scheuer,
that Bivens might have overruled Gregoire. Engdahl, supra note 6, at 54. This implies
that Hand's logic in Gregoire, while still compelling, may no longer represent overriding
considerations.
32. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932), quoted in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (1974). In Sterling the Governor of Texas justified
seizure of certain oil wells because of an insurrection. Rejecting the argument that the
Governor's determination was unreviewable, the Court examined the facts involved, de-
termined that the Governor's actions were indefensible, and granted the plaintiff's re-
quest for a restraining order.3.94 S. Ct.at 1692,
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belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive of-
ficers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.3"
The lower courts were admonished not to presume either an official's
good faith or the existence of reasonable justification for the actions
taken.35 Although distinguishing between duties involving little discre-
tion and those in which the range of possible decisions is "virtually in-
finite,"36 the Court rejected any categorical distinction between minis-
terial and discretionary functions as a basis for the immunity.87 Con-
centrating instead on the nature of the particular duties allegedly
abused, the Court incorporated the subjective "good faith" and objec-
tive "reasonableness" standards of Pierson v. Ray8" into a qualified im-
munity for discretionary actions. Thus, the extent of the immunity
would vary with the scope of discretion dictated by the circumstances
of the case. 39
The Court's proposed standards reflect the complicated considera-
tions inherent in damage actions involving official abuse of discretion-
ary powers. As an official's range of viable options increases, it
becomes more difficult to formulate clear-cut grounds for liability. 40 In
determining whether an official acted within the scope of his permis-
sible discretion, lower courts have agreed with the Supreme Court that
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1693.
36. Id. at 1691.
37. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 297-
301 (1937) criticizes such distinctions as tests in determining administrative liability.
38. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
39. Judge Celebrezze's two-tier analytical framework would be adaptable to the
Court's formation-if the actions were "within the range of discretionary measures
which were justified by the exigencies of the situation," defenses of good faith or honest
belief became relevant; if outside that range, the defenses were not allowed. Krause
v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 463 (6th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion). The initial de-
termination is whether the action was within the permissible scope of discretion. In
one case, for example, involving libel rather than a section 1983 violation, immunity
was granted for statements made during the school board's investigation of a superinten-
dent, but comments to newspaper reporters were ultra vires and therefore not protected.
iUpman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961).
40. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently had to consider grounds for liabil-
ity for executive officials with differing levels of responsibility in Roberts v. Williams,
456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). The court found a super-
intendent of a prison farm personally liable when a trusty guard that he appointed shot
an inmate. The ground for liability was the superintendent's failure adequately to train
and supervise the guard, who was twenty-three years old, had only a fourth-grade educa-
tion, and had been previously convicted of assault with intent to kill. Id. at 821-22.
Despite their awareness of the superintendent's policies, however, members of the farm's
board of supervisors were deemed not liable for a "good faith, reasonable choice among
valid policy alternatives, even if an unwise one. . . ." Id. at 831.
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certain governmental responsibilities entail broad discretion. 41  Gover-
nor Rhodes' initial deployment of the guard may well have been a
reasonable choice among valid alternatives unless, however, he were
aware of the guard's purported unusual propensity for violence. 42 He
might also be liable if he later incited the use of unnecessary force at
Kent State.43 It would be more difficult to find the Kent State presi-
dent's conduct actionable merely because of his passive acquiescence
in the governor's apparent authority.44
Despite greater fairness to section 1983 claimants and increased
official accountability for unconstitutional acts, the conflict between
these important considerations and the policy justifications for immunity
remains unresolved. Fear of personal liability still results in indecision,
and defending claims is highly burdensome.4 5, On the other hand,
broad immunities can bar plaintiffs from any effective avenue of
redress.46
Scheuer's attempt to reconcile these competing policy considera-
tions also raises some uncertainties47 and problems. First, analysis of
the immunity solely in terms of the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions arguably ignores the seriousness of the alleged offense. 48 This
41. Id. at 831.
42. The Ohio National Guard in 1970, according to one charge made after the
Kent State tragedy, was particularly prone to violence because of the nature of their
training and use of loaded weapons. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
Roberts, for example, suggested that the board of supervisors members might have been
personally liable on charges of cruel and unusual punishment under section 1983 if they
had been aware of certain disciplinary practices at the camp. Roberts v. Williams, 456
F.2d 819, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). Although Governor
Rhodes' knowledge of the guard's propensity for violence would not be actionable, that
knowledge might suggest the unreasonableness of dispatching the guard to Kent State.
43. See note 12 supra.
44. Personal liability for educators is an increasing concern. One commentator
believes that members of a board of regents in general are not "proper parties" to a dam-
age action. McCormack, supra note 4, at 16.
45. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
46. A governor, for example, may be immune for reasonably choosing between
valid policy alternatives and soldiers immune in carrying out their duties in a reasonable
manner. Thus no recovery would be possible even if a plaintiff unquestionably was de-
prived of constitutional rights by the combination of actions.
47. One such uncertainty concerns the applicability of the Scheuer qualified im-
munity standards to equitable remedies. Unlike damage actions, equity suits under sec-
tion 1983 generally involve the performance or nonperformance of official duties with-
out the attendant threat of extensive personal liability to officials. Considerations of
indecisive action or injustice to officials that justify executive immunities in damage ac-
tions are much less relevant in equity suits. Justification for a qualified immunity might
exist, however, because of the potentially disruptive effect of equity suits on government
and the general reluctance of courts to review fully the constitutionality of every deci-
sion of executive branch officials.
48. One commentator would assess executive immunity claims in terms of the
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particular shortcoming, however, may be more apparent than real; the
Court's assessment of the reasonableness of an official's conduct would
certainly take into account the likelihood that such conduct would in-
duce unnecessary violence.49
In addition, Scheuer may encourage suits by claimants with minor,
or even feckless, grievances. 50 Therefore, a narrower definition of the
claims permitted under section 1983 possibly should accompany the
lowering of the immunity barrier. 1 Recognizing the fundamental
change in federal-state relations resulting from section 1983,2 Con-
gress carefully limited recoveries to "rights, privileges, and immunities"
secured by the Constitution. s Since the act was designed to supple-
ment rather than to supplant traditional state remedies, the rapid ex-
pansion of the scope of actions permitted under the section has elicited
criticism.5  Greater care in restricting these actions would protect both
the federal courts and government officials from relatively minor claims
that should not be considered "constitutional torts." 56
character and severity of the plaintiffs injury, the existence of alternative remedies, the
court's capacity to evaluate the propriety of the official's acts and the effect of liability
on effective administration. Jaffe, supra note 9, at 219.
49. One aspect of determining reasonableness should be the foreseeability of types
of injuries that a certain action might produce, with actions risking unreasonable in-
juries being outside the scope of permissible discretion. Resort to military action, for
example, "has traditionally been viewed with suspicion and skepticism." Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (1974).
50. In Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964), for example, the
plaintiff named forty-four different defendants representing almost every level of gov-
ernment service. The complaint was dismissed on traditional immunity grounds.
51. One list of wrongs actionable under section 1983 included violations of speech,
assembly, religion, privacy; racial discrimination in labor, education, housing, public ac-
commodations, and voting; economic discrimination, the right to bear arms, freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to vote and to participate in political
processes; due process in criminal investigating, indictment, trials and appeal; and equal-
ity in legislative and congressional apportionment. Comment, Civil Actions for Dam-
ages under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TExAs L. Rav. 1015, 1021 (1967).
52. The "legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it
was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the pro-
tection of federally created rights." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), hold-
ing that section 1983 provided an authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute.
53. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
54. See McCormack, supra note 4, at 7.
55. Although immunities are one means of limiting redress, the policy considera-
tions supporting immunities differ from those justifying restrictions on section 1983 ac-
tions. The goals of the latter are avoidance of unnecessary preemption of traditional
state torts and the protection of the federal courts from a flood of relatively minor
claims. Qualified immunities, on the other hand, exempt tortfeasors from personal lia-
bility whenever certain conditions are met, regardless of the seriousness of the violation
and the availability of redress from other sources.
56. Compare Shapo, Constitutional Tort Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Be-
yond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 277, 324, 327 (1965), with McCormack, supra note 4, at 7-
10, Shapo, suggesting the dangers of preempting state laws, wo ld liit acteonb19 iq-
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Another means of guarding against undue harassment of officials
would be to redefine the traditional role of qualified immunities. The
Supreme Court's emphasis on reasonableness 57 to justify executive con-
duct is analagous to the "reasonable man" standard in torts. Thus, a
"reasonable official" standard might be adopted, with the scope of per-
missible discretion inherent in the office becoming an important con-
sideration in determining the reasonableness of the conduct. In addi-
tion, rather than a defendant asserting and proving an affirmative de-
fense, the section 1983 plaintiff might be required to overcome a
presumption of reasonableness of the official's conduct.58
Even though unnecessary harassment of executive officials can be
minimized, 59 the detente between executive immunities and section
1983 actions remains fragile. As long as governments summarily deny
responsibility for wrongful actions of their employees, 0 the Scheuer
approach may nevertheless be the best available. Since reliance on the
individual offender for redress in these situations is inadequate, govern-
ment responsibility is imperative as the only feasible means of recon-
ciling the conflicting policy considerations between executive immuni-
ties and section 1983 actions. 61 If governments would acknowledge
the common-law assurance of state indemnity for damages incurred by
a public official's exercise of good faith judgment,"2 restraints on
decisive action would clearly be reduced. A government's shielding
juries to "outrageous" situations. Stressing that the federal remedy is supplementary to
state remedies, McCormack criticizes Shapo's definition of constitutional torts as being
too dependent on emotion and, instead, would emphasize the form of the remedy and
a plaintiffs reasonable belief that the officer was pursuing a governmental objective.
57. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (1974).
58. Caution should be taken, however, not to make the plaintiff's burden too
onerous. Summary judgment can be another valid means of protecting defendants from
frivolous claims, but the Court appears concerned that section 1983 claimants not be
dismissed prematurely. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
59. Other means of protecting government officials are also available. Govern-
ments could agree to reimburse officials for defense expenses if the officials were ulti-
mately exonerated or if they could demonstrate good faith. The greater use of adminis-
trative boards and procedures, though possibly of little help in emergency situations,
would protect plaintiffs' rights and provide a convenient forum for presentation of the
reasons for an official's actions. See Jennings, supra note 37, at 306-14, for a thorough
analysis of administrative processes that could be established.
60. McCormack, supra note 4, at 29, concluded that "vicarious liability would be
an effective deterrent, and therefore it is unfortunate that the Court dismissed it out of
hand" in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
61. There is little reason now for states not to acknowledge financial responsibility
for their employees' actions. "Given the availability of insurance and the ability of
states to raise revenues, there is no reason to protect the state from the legitimate claims
of its constituents." Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct:
The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. Rnv. 548, 558 1972),
62, Jaffe, supra note 9, at g16,
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-fbbth the individual official and itself from suit may also deny a due
process right to redress under section 1983.8 As a corollary, not only
-should at least one defendant be amenable to suit but, in the interests
of justice, he should also be financially responsible.
Although Chief Justice Burger has recommended a viable format
for congressional action in this area, 64 legislatures have been unwilling
to take the needed steps. 5 Although the Court might understandably
prefer that legislative action break the sovereign immunity barrier, 0
Congress arguably has already expressed its intent in enacting section
1983. Since judicial value judgments created the initial expansion of
state immunities, the Court should possibly re-examine those judgments
and affix "respondeat superior" responsibility to governments for un-constitutional employee actions.67  Scheuer, however, may have accom-
plished this more subtly. With officials subject to personal liability,
governments may find that to attract and keep qualified executive per-
sonnel, they will have to protect those officials from expensive damage
actions either through assurances of indemnity or by consenting to
suit.6
8
63. Verkuil, supra note 61, at 597.
64. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-23 (1971) (dissent-
ing opinion). In launching an attack on the exclusionary rule, the Chief Justice sug-
gested the creation of an effective means of redress for citizens whose rights are violated
by unlawful fourth amendment conduct by government officials. These suggestions for
a remedy against the government itself appear adaptable to section 1983 violations:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to illegal acts of law enforcement
officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any per-
son aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth
Amendment or statutes regulating official conduct;(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps pat-
"terned after the United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under
the statute ...
Id. at 422-23.
65. Governments have generally refused to acknowledge liability for employee ac-
tions. See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 18, 55-56. Engdahl concluded that even the right
to indemnity would provide little solace when the state refused to be sued for indemnity.
He suggested that the replacement of older nineteenth century immunity standards,
which were quite harsh on executive officials, would be unqualifiedly beneficial if effec-
tive alternative means for redress were available for aggrieved plaintiffs.
66. Previous eleventh amendment interpretations, the long existence of the im-
munities, and the considerable financial burden that might be felt by governments would
certainly help explain the Court's reluctance.
67. The Court has not refrained from imposing financial burdens on governments
when constitutional rights were at stake. In Griffin v. Board of Educ., 377 U.S. 218(1964), for example, the Court demanded that public schools be kept open even if local
taxes had to be raised.
68. State and federal governments will be affected because the Scheuer standards
have already been held applicable to federal executive officials. States Marine Lines,
Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (1974).
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The Supreme Court has taken important steps toward assuring that
section 1983 claims against executive officials will have a full hearing
in federal courts. Initiating a reevaluation of governmental immunity
justifications, the Court has also proposed a workable qualified immun-
ity standard for alleged abuses of discretionary power. The Court's
concern for the plight of citizens deprived of constitutional rights under
color of state law hopefully will reveal the inadequacy of relying solely
on individual officials for compensation. The Court has recognized the
necessity for individual accountability in section 1983 actions. The
next step, whether taken by the legislature or the judiciary, is to assure
that the accountability is extended to the government. Employer
responsibility for the actions of its employees, especially when the em-
ployer has clothed those actions in the legitimacy of state law, cannot
justifiably end where government employment begins.
WILLIAM JAMES SEIGLER 1

